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"Freedom of association" is an American ideal much like "free
speech," but neither is free nor absolute. Qualifications limit both of these
concepts. There is the Holmesian precept that one may not "yell fire in a
crowded theater" when there is no fire and claim First Amendment
protection.1 Similarly, freedom of association can be limited in certain
circumstances in order to protect public safety, enforce anti-discrimination
laws, and prevent unlawful conspiracies.2 The historical difficulty has
always been to strike the appropriate balance between civil liberties and the
protection of order during periods of domestic insecurity, such as wartime,
terrorist attacks, or the Cold War on communism.
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1. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.
It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all
the effect of force.").
2. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984) (stating that
the right of association does not prevent enforcement of anti-discrimination laws).
3. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
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This Article examines the proper limits of labor's freedom of
association in the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)
defines labor's freedom of association as:
[T]he right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.
While section 7 of the NLRA is the foundation of the rights guaranteed to
American private sector workers, it is only the starting point for labor's
freedom of association. The NLRA protects those workers defined by the
statute as "employees." 5 Many of the principles embodied in the NLRA
are afforded to public sector employees through the Constitution, federal
statutes, and state-by-state regulation. All public and private sector
employees, on the other hand, are protected by international labor laws
regarding the freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
The question is whether or not labor's freedom of association has been
harmed in the post-9/11 period as a result of national security concerns. I
argue that labor's freedom of association, like other civil liberties, is under
stress in the post-9/11 period because of certain federal legislation and
actions by the Executive Branch. In addition, decisions of the courts and
administrative adjudicators have limited labor's freedom of association
over exaggerated concerns about national security. This stress can be
relieved through judicial reaffirmation of the principles embodied in
section 7 of the NLRA and the U.S. Constitution, and also by upholding the
international principles to which the U.S. government must conform.
The post-9/l1 strain upon labor's freedom of association has deep
historical roots in other periods of domestic insecurity. Many look to the
history of labor's freedom of association and see destabilizing strikes,
inflexible bureaucracies and increased immigration-all of which are
thought to threaten national security. These same concerns about labor
activity are present post-9/1 1. This Article's main argument is that the
post-9/l1 environment of fear and insecurity has weakened labor's freedom
of association through actions by Congress and the President, and through
decisions of the courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
"Board"). International legal instruments call into question the actions of
dissenting) (noting that government's power to restrict speech is greater in times of war than
in times of peace "because war opens dangers that do not exist at other times").
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (defining "employee").
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government agencies and courts in the post-9/ 11 period that have used
national security and fears of terrorism to limit labor's freedom of
association.
The thesis described above is based on three interrelated foundations.
First, labor's freedom of association should be considered in tandem with
the other recognized "political" civil liberties, such as freedom of speech
and assembly, freedom from unreasonable search and seizures, due
process, and the right to vote. The right of private sector workers to picket,
speak, and assemble is protected, within limits, against governmental
interference by the First Amendment. Public employees can invoke First,
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections, within limits, against
their governmental employers. Thus, labor and employment rights
historically have been inextricably linked to civil liberties.
The second theoretical foundation follows from the first. If labor
organizing and association is a civil liberty, then Congressional limitations
on the freedom of speech, assembly, and privacy will affect labor's
freedom of association. This exemplifies the theory that the retrenchment
of rights against one group of people leads to the reduction of other
liberties and the limitations of the rights of other groups. In modern
politics, much of the focus on security has been on increasing border
security, stripping jurisdiction to hear the appeals of immigrants, and
scrutinizing the associations of noncitizens as potential "terrorist
organizations." Labor unions today see much of their growth, as they have
throughout history, in immigrants seeking a better life. Immigrants,
whether documented or not, can be chilled from exercising their freedom of
association rights guaranteed by federal and international law if they will
be ensnared by laws which guarantee deportation or detention for past
minor criminal acts, innocent affiliations, or unlawful entry. The post-9/11
period has seen a proliferation of legislation making it harder to challenge
governmental actions against immigrants.6
Finally, courts have erred on the side of public order when
adjudicating civil liberties during wartime and other times of national
instability, such as the World War I era and now the War on Terror. There
have been some examples of judicial intervention to protect rights during
all of these periods. Historically, however, the courts have largely deferred
to the government at the beginning of perceived crises but eventually
6. See Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The
Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REv. 1185 (2002)
(examining the implications of post-9/l1 immigration enforcement); see also Raquel
Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11 "National Security" Cases: Three Principles Guiding Judges'
Decision-Making, 81 OR. L. REV. 985, 1049 (2002) ("[T]he executive appears to have
exceeded the reasonable scope of any inherent executive powers in national security affairs
by proscribing federal courts and habeas corpus jurisdiction without congressional
approval.").
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moved to protect rights. Private entities have benefited from the courts'
preference for public order in times of instability. Labor adjudication since
9/11 shows that actions by private employers and employees that might
have an effect on national security result in courts and administrative
agencies minimizing labor's freedom of association in favor of perceived
security concerns. This concern over national security can be seen in cases
involving: (1) retaliation by private sector employers against
undocumented immigrants; (2) the right of nonunion workers to have a
fellow employee present during disciplinary interviews; and (3) the
question of labor rights for private sector employees performing federally
mandated security functions. In each of these cases, labor adjudicators
have either used terrorism to legitimize actions that they would have taken
regardless of security concerns, or they have overreacted to the claim that
labor's freedom of association threatens national security.
Part III of this Article explores how the three previously described
theoretical foundations explain the actions of the President and Congress in
the post-9/11 period. The national instability occasioned by the 9/11
attacks and the War on Terror has weakened labor's freedom of association
in four areas: (1) the USA PATRIOT Act, which facilitates greater
surveillance and privacy violations in private sector workplaces; (2) the use
of labor law emergency powers to end a 2002 port strike on the West
Coast; (3) the loss of collective bargaining rights by security screeners at
the nation's airports; and (4) the overhaul of civil service rules in federal
personnel systems. All of these actions were facilitated by long-standing
rhetorical connections between collective bargaining, terrorism, and
instability.
In Part IV, I discuss labor law adjudication in the post-9/11 period. In
several decisions since 9/11, concerns about terrorism have affected the
courts' and the NLRB's decisions in direct and indirect ways. The question
of whether or not undocumented immigrants should have access to the
same remedies available to authorized workers for unfair labor practices
came before the United States Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.7 Although not directly addressed in the
decision, the immigration control system's failure to keep the 9/11
hijackers out of the United States probably led to the Court privileging
immigration control over labor rights in Hoffman. The NLRB has also
decided cases since 9/11 where terrorism was both a subtext and an explicit
justification for decisions that limited labor's freedom of association.
Although labor's freedom of association is protected by federal
statutes and constitutional law, domestic law has proven an inadequate
foundation for these labor rights. Thus, in Part V, I look to international
7. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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law to strengthen labor's freedom of association. The application of
international law is controversial. Some believe that international law
intrudes too far into the nation's sovereign ability to determine its own
laws, while many labor rights advocates believe that international law
provides an inadequate enforcement mechanism for domestic labor
violations. Indeed, there is much room for improvement in the
enforcement of international labor rights. An answer to both the poor
enforcement critics and the sovereignty critics is that international labor
law principles are already part of the fabric of U.S. law through ratified
treaties and incorporation of the "Law of Nations" into federal statutes such
as the Alien Tort Claims Act.8 Thus, courts and administrative agencies, in
their enforcement of domestic labor law, should take into account relevant
international principles as a backdrop when domestic labor law does not
provide a clear answer.
Courts and administrative agencies can separate legitimate national
security concerns from pretext through more attention to the empirical
realities that show why freedom of association and collective bargaining
are not threats to national security. National security may be better served
by respecting labor's freedom of association because unionization results in
lower turnover rates, higher wages, protection for whistleblowers, and
greater democratic participation.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LABOR AND LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF
EMERGENCY
The three theoretical foundations of this Article are: (1) the rights to
organize and bargain collectively, in addition to being fundamental human
rights, are also civil liberties; (2) the retrenchment of rights in specific areas
of public life leads to a devolution of rights in other areas, including private
domains; and (3) historical events affect the way that adjudicative bodies
decide and justify cases. I will discuss each of these foundations in turn.
A. Connections Between Civil Liberties and Labor Rights
"Civil liberties" are fundamental individual rights that are protected by
law against unwarranted governmental or other interference. Rights are
often considered civil liberties because they are essential to the proper
functioning of the democratic process. Thus, common civil liberties
include freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to vote.9
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.").
9. U.S. CONST. amends. I & IV.
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These civil liberties have been woven into the historical fabric of American
society through the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Civil liberties
are particularly fragile during times of domestic insecurity. Liberties such
as freedom of speech, freedom to associate in political organizations, and
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures have been historically
curtailed during war times such as World War II and the Cold War.' This
trend has continued during the U.S. government's response to 9/11: the
War on Terror."
While labor rights are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution,
they are firmly rooted in civil libertarian concepts. The right to organize as
private sector employers is protected primarily by the NLRA. 12 However,
the basis for the right to organize arises out of the rights of free speech and
freedom of assembly. Similarly, the freedom of workers to act collectively
is derived from basic civil liberties. 3
As case law shows, civil liberties have played a major role in cases
regarding the right to organize. In the 1937 decision Hague v. Committee
for Industrial Organization, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to
free speech includes labor picketing. 14 Three years later, in Thornhill v.
Alabama, the Court held that ordinances prohibiting injury to businesses
could not be enforced against lawful boycotting and picketing activities
10. See JUDITH STEPAN-NORRIS & MAURICE ZEITLIN, LEFT OUT: REDS AND AMERICA'S
INDUSTRIAL UNIONS 101 (Cambridge University Press 2003) (exploring unionism during the
Cold War era); see also ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S
LAWYER 99-114 (Harvard University Press 1983) (arguing that the Cold War was a way to
blunt labor's militancy).
11. The U.S. led "War on Terror" defies logical definition because, as Noam Chomsky
has pointed out, the definition of what is "terror" shifts depending on who is waging it. See
Noam Chomsky, DISTORTED MORALITY: A WAR ON TERROR?, Lecture at Harvard
University (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.chomsky.info/talks/200202--02.htm
(exploring how "terror" has been defined throughout history). Perhaps recognizing that
"War on Terrorism" was a poor description, Bush administration officials started using the
term "global struggle against violent extremism." See Eric Schmitt & Thorn Shanker, New
Name for "War on Terror" Reflects Wider U.S. Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2005, at A7
("Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the National Press Club
... that he had 'objected to the use of the term "war on terrorism" before, because if you
call it war, then you think of people in uniform as being the solution."'). See also PHILLIP B.
HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 87 (2003)
(questioning the metaphor of a war on terror because it fails to take into account the non-
temporary nature of the war and the lack of a clearly defined enemy). For the purposes of
this Article, however, I will define "the War on Terror" as the U.S. government's response
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
13. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in the part relevant to
this Article, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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under the First Amendment.1 5 In addition, the First Amendment protects
labor against repression from state law enforcement and state employers.
16
Government employees, subject to some exceptions, are also protected by
the First Amendment when they attempt to organize unions. 17 As early as
1945, however, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that, for public
employees, the right "to discuss, and inform people concerning, the
advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them" is protected not
only as a part of free speech, but as part of free assembly. 8
Further, the right of association, grounded in the "right of the people
peaceably to assemble" in the First Amendment, was first recognized in
cases preventing government interference in the organizational activities of
civil rights groups such as NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson.'9 More
recent Supreme Court cases, such as Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston, have protected the rights of
organizations to exclude members on account of sexual orientation. 20 This
latter conception of freedom of association is an example of the negative
conception that government's role is to protect the right to exclude from
15. 310 U.S. 88(1940).
16. First Amendment protection is not absolute, however. See Waters v. Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 674 (1993) ("[C]onstitutional review of government employment decisions must
rest on different principles than review of speech restraints imposed by the government as
sovereign."); Hanover Twp. Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Cmty. Sch. Corp., 457 F.2d 456,
460 (7th Cir. 1972) (acknowledging that not "all activities of a union or its members are
constitutionally protected"); Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. City of
Muskegon, 120 N.W.2d 197 (Mich. 1963) (finding that contracts prohibiting public
employees from joining unions are constitutionally permissible).
17. See Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d
137, 140 (8th Cir. 1969) ("No paramount public interest . . . warranted limiting the
plaintiffs right to freedom of association."); McLauglin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288-89
(7th Cir. 1968) ("Public employment may not be subjected to unreasonable conditions, and
the assertion of First Amendment rights by teachers will usually not warrant their dismissal.
... Unless there is some illegal intent, an individual's right to form and join a union is
protected by the First Amendment."); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068
(W.D.N.C. 1969) (holding a state statute prohibiting union participation by government
employees unconstitutional). But see Smith v. Ark. City Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979)
(standing for the idea that the First Amendment may give public employees the right to
associate, but it does not give them a protected right to bargain).
18. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (citing Hague v. Comm. for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)).
19. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
20. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What's Really Wrong
with Compelled Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 839 (2005) (advocating freedom of
association, including the freedom to exclude unwanted members, because freedom of
association is an amplification of freedom of speech); see also Nancy L. Rosenblum,
Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (rejecting the principal
justifications offered for compelled association).
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associations, rather than the positive conception that government's role is
to encourage associations of disparate groups and people.2'
In addition to its inherent protection by the First Amendment, labor's
freedom of association has been protected by federal statute since 1935. In
section 1 of the NLRA, Congress declared:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the
purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing
the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working
conditions within and between industries.
22
Congress saw freedom of association as crucial to equalize the balance of
power between employers and employees. Section 7 of the NLRA protects
freedom of association against interference by private sector employers.
Section 7 protects employees' "right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.,
23
Freedom of association is not important for merely economic purposes.
Employee associations have long been active participants in the democratic
process.24 In the 2004 election, for example, votes from union households
accounted for 24% of all votes, even though only about 8% of all private
sector workers are in unions.25 Section 7 also explicitly protects the right
not to associate, which has led to decisions affirming the right of workers
to opt out of political activities.26
The right to associate in section 7 of the NLRA also includes the right
to strike and engage in related informational activities (such as picketing,
boycotts, and leafleting), subject to the express and implied restrictions
21. See SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND
POLITICAL THEORY (1992) (discussing how the freedom not to associate follows from the
freedom to associate).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
24. EDWARD S. GREENBERG, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF
PARTICIPATION 122-28 (1988).
25. Steven Greenhouse, Four Major Unions Plan to Boycott A.F.L-C.LO. Event, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2005, at Al.
26. Section 7 explicitly states that employees have "the right to refrain" from concerted
activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988) (finding required union fees for politics a violation of fair representation); see also
Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (invalidating mandatory
union fees for non-bargaining purposes).
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imposed by other parts of the NLRA. 27 The right to strike is considered
part of the "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection" that are protected by section 7.28 While
NLRA section 8(a)(5) places a duty to bargain in good faith with the union
selected by the majority of workers at a workplace, section 7 also protects
employees' right to bargain "through representatives of their own
choosing."2 9
In addition to constitutional and statutory protections, the rights to
associate, to bargain collectively, and to strike are recognized as
fundamental human rights in several international treaties to which the
United States is a signatory (discussed in detail in Part V). All of these
rights begin with the freedom of association.30 "Freedom of association" in
the international context refers primarily to the freedom to form and join
labor unions, though the freedom to join any association is contemplated by
the international standards. Governments have affirmative obligations
under these treaties not to harm the right to associate. Even though private
parties are primarily responsible for denials of the right to organize,
governments have an affirmative obligation under these international
treaties to protect these rights through enforcement and legislation. Trade
agreements also place this requirement on the United States.3'
There is some dispute about whether or not the "choice not to
associate" is in keeping with the international conception of freedom of
association. Roy J. Adams writes, "[I]n Europe the hypothetical right to
desist from participating in enterprise decision-making is not considered to
be legitimate. 3 2 Indeed, the claim that workers should have the choice to
27. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000) (prohibiting secondary boycotts and
picketing of a neutral employer in labor disputes).
28. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1962) (allowing employees to
act in concert in protest of work conditions); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel., 304 U.S. 333
(1938) (ruling that striking employees acting in concert could not be discriminated against).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). See also § 158(a)(5) (requiring an employer to bargain
collectively with representatives of his employees); CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE
AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005)
(exploring section 7 as protection for a minority of workers at a workplace).
30. See Patrick Macklem, The Right to Bargain Collectively in International Law:
Workers' Right, Human Right, International Right?, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
61 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Stuart White, Trade Unionism in a Liberal State, in FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION 330 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (noting the importance of trade unions to
the associational life of Britain and the United States).
31. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation, Principle 1, available at http://www.naalc.org/english/objective.shtml
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (agreeing that NAFTA member countries, such as the United
States, are committed to promoting freedom of association).
32. Roy J. Adams, Voice for All: Why the Right to Refrain from Collective Bargaining
Is No Right at All, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 142, 147 (James A. Gross ed.,
2003).
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bargain individually with an employer may be akin to saying that the law
protects the choice of the rich and poor alike to sleep beneath bridges-the
rich are the only ones who can be said to have a real choice.3
Nevertheless, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has recognized
that the right not to associate is a corollary to the right to associate, so there
is apparently little difference between the liberties protected by the ILO and
the U.S. Constitution. An array of federal laws and rulings make it clear
that unions have no concomitant right to exclude members with whom they
would rather not associate.34
As the ILO has recognized, "political" civil liberties are a necessary
precondition for the effective exercise of labor's rights of association and
collective bargaining.35 Countries with a history of political repression,
such as China, Burma (now Myanmar) and Indonesia have restricted the
rights of free and independent trade unions.36 The Solidarity movement in
Poland is an example of the way that global labor movements have led to
democratic change and of the connection between civil liberties and labor
rights.37 The strikes of the Solidarity movement played an important role in
the opening of Polish society.38
33. "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids all men to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets, and to steal bread-the rich as well as the poor." Anatole France, THE NEW
LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM: QUOTATIONS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, IN BRIEF 19
(Kathryn Zullo et al. eds., 2001).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1994) (stating that employees cannot be dismissed for
failing to be full-fledged members of the union); Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
411(a)(l)-(2) (2000) (guaranteeing equal rights of union members and the right of union
members to free speech and assembly); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (2000) (applying anti-
discrimination laws to the practices of labor organizations); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967) (holding that a union has a duty of fair representation to members and nonmembers
alike as the statutory bargaining representative).
35. See Bernard Gernigon, et al., Freedom of Association, in Fundamental Rights at
Work and International Labour Standards, Principle 2.3.1 at 13 (International Labour
Organization 2003) (stating that freedom of association is dependent on civil and political
rights).
36. See, e.g., Sara Davis & Mickey Spiegel, Take Tough Action To End China's Mining
Tragedies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at A7 (detailing the illegal condition in some of
China's mines); Marc Lifsher, Unocal Settles Human Rights Lawsuit Over Alleged Abuses
at Myanmar Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at C l (describing suit alleging violation of
human rights by Unocal in Myanmar); U.S./Indonesia: Bush Backtracks on Corporate
Responsibility, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 7, 2002, available at http://www.hrw.org/
press/2002/08/exxon080702.htm (reporting charges brought against Exxon Mobil for human
rights violations in Indonesia).
37. See, e.g., LAWRENCE GOODWYN, BREAKING THE BARRIER: THE RISE OF SOLIDARITY
IN POLAND 226-35 (1991) (recounting the initial stages of the Solidarity movement in
Poland's labor movement); Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A
Call for Revisiting the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 621 (2005)
(pointing to the Polish solidarity movement as evidence of the important role played by
unions in forming democracies).
38. See, e.g., Shannan C. Krasnokutski, Human Rights in Transition: The Success and
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The connections between civil liberties and the fundamental rights to
organize have been implicit for some time. This Article makes these
connections explicit. This Article begins from the theoretical assertion that
labor rights are themselves civil liberties because labor rights cannot exist
in the absence of civil liberties. One of the reasons that labor's freedom of
association is protected by international law is the positive relationship
between an independent trade union movement and the exercise of other
internationally recognized rights to speech, assembly, and democratic
representation. Like other civil liberties, labor's rights to organize and
bargain collectively are threatened in times of domestic insecurity.
B. The Retrenchment ofRights
Political repression in a particular social context often leads to
repression in other spheres of democratic societies. I call this effect the
"retrenchment of rights." Once rights for one group of people are
diminished, the retrenchment process provides the momentum and
justification to suppress rights of other interrelated groups.
Scholars have observed these effects in other periods of history.39 For
example, Alexander Tsesis has argued that hate speech movements lead to
official repression against minorities.4 ° In addition, Richard Delgado's
theory of "justice at war" posits that minorities are at risk in times of
attacks on civil liberties.4' David Cole argues that repression against
noncitizens eventually leads to limitations on the rights of citizens.42
The post-9/11 political and socioeconomic climate has triggered a new
era in the devolution of rights. Efforts to curb terrorism have led to a
diminution of civil liberties through laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act.43
Failure of Polish and Russian Criminal Justice Reform, 33 CASE W. RESERVE INT'L L. J. 13,
19-23 (2001) (noting that the Solidarity movement was critical in removing communism
from Poland).
39. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003) (evaluating the rights afforded to aliens post-
September 11); RICHARD DELGADO, JUSTICE AT WAR: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS
DURING TIMES OF CRISIS 66-69 (2003) (describing the erosion of civil liberties in wartime);
ALEXANDER TSESIs, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR
HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2002) (analyzing instances where freedom of speech led to
harmful events); William D. Hartung, Homeland Insecurity: The War on Terror and the
War on Labor, 13 NEW LABOR FORUM 9 (2004) (describing the ways that the War on Terror
has reduced domestic social programs for working people).
40. TSESIS, supra note 39.
41. See DELGADO, supra note 39, at 57-58 (arguing that wartime emergencies are used
to excuse the violations of civil rights).
42. COLE, supra note 39. See also DELGADO, supra note 39, at 167 (citing the treatment
of Mexicans as an example).
43. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
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As I will discuss in this Article, the USA PATRIOT Act has attacked key
civil liberties such as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, freedom of speech, and privacy. 4  This initial attack on civil
liberties has devolved into an offensive on workers' rights. This Article
analyzes how the goal of preventing terrorist activities has also been used
as justification for curbing the rights of workers, particularly the right of
association. This degeneration of rights is the latest manifestation of
reducing the rights of workers in the name of national security.
It is important to note that the retrenchment of rights is caused by the
complex interaction of many factors. Historically, there have been many
political and socio-economic factors that have led to the diminution of
workers' rights. However, restrictions on one group in the name of a goal
such as national security helps provide justification and momentum for
imposing restrictions on other groups.
C. In the Name of Security: Rhetoric, Causation, and Legitimization
This Article proceeds from the legal realist view that historical events
affect legislation and adjudication.45 While one cannot always claim direct
Stat. 272 (2001).
44. See Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Liberties Post-September 11: A Time of Danger, A
Time of Opportunity, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 3 (2003) (providing an overview of
articles which discuss civil liberties and post-9/11 legislation); Natsu Taylor Saito, For
"Our" Security: Who Is an "American" and What Is Protected by EnhancedLaw
Enforcement and Intelligence Powers?, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 23 (2003) (addressing
the restrictions of civil liberties of immigrants due to the USA PATRIOT Act and, if passed,
PATRIOT II); Nadine Strossen, Suspected Terrorists One and All: Reclaiming Our Civil
Liberties in the Total Information Awareness Age, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 15 (2003)
(calling for limitations on the government's power to investigate personal information).
45. Legal realism posits that law can only be understood in its historical and social
context. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995) (exploring the empirical study of the law as legal realism); Patricia Ewick,
Robert A. Kagan & Austin Sarat, Legacies of Legal Realism: Social Science, Social Policy,
and the Law, in SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 1 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds.,
1999) (introducing the study of law and social science); Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling,
From Legal Realism to Law and Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social
Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC'Y. REv. 409 (1998) (examining the establishment of the Law
and Society Association); Jonathan Simon, Law After Society, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 143
(1999) (discussing the interaction between the study of law and society); see also Ruben J.
Garcia, New Voices at Work Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor
Movement, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 117 (2002) (evaluating race and gender influence on new
legal doctrine dealing with minorities and their bargaining power); Margaret H. Taylor,
Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES
(David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck, eds., 2005) (analyzing from a legal realist perspective
the Supreme Court's rejection of a due process challenge to a statute mandating detention
without bond for virtually all noncitizen offenders facing deportation in the post-9/1 1
environment).
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causation between world events and legal decisions, the impact that social
realities have on decision makers should not be underestimated.
Furthermore, world events can serve to legitimize actions, reducing the
scrutiny that the actions would have received were it not for the
precipitating events.46 Finally, judicial decisions cannot be easily divorced
from their historical context, even when judges do not specifically refer to
the events in their opinions.
One of the most infamous examples of this kind of legitimation is
Korematsu v. United States.47 The Korematsu decision quite explicitly was
a product of its time. The U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether the President could suspend the constitutional rights of
approximately 110,000 interned Japanese-American immigrants and
citizens during World War II. In the wartime climate, it was not surprising
that the Supreme Court found the racially motivated detention of certain
people necessary for national security. In reaching that conclusion, the
Court deferred to the military's and government's views of the threat that
persons of Japanese ancestry posed to the country.48 Korematsu was a
product of several factors, such as racism, the need to regulate labor and
immigration, and enhanced security concerns, but the decision was
legitimized by the climate of fear that predominated in the country after the
attack on Pearl Harbor.4
D. Historical Connections Among the Three Foundations
The World War I era "Free Speech Fights" waged by the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW), also known as the "Wobblies," exemplify
46. See Susan Bibler Coutin et al., In the Mirror: The Legitimation Function of
Globalization, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 801 (2002) (examining the legitimation work of
globalization as a result of actual immigration, finance, and intercountry adoption event and
policies).
47. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh'g denied, Korematsu v. United States, 324 U.S. 885
(1945).
48. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (giving deference to the
military's decision). See also PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 213-14 (1983) (recounting
how then-California Attorney General Earl Warren presented testimony to Congress about
the possibility of "sabotage and fifth-column activity" through Japanese associations); ERIC
K. YAMAMOTO, ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT 123 (2001) (studying the rationalization of discrimination based on race).
49. See Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress and Denial, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 933 (2004) (challenging the traditional view that the courts were "duped" by the
Justice Department's exaggerated claims of the threat during wartime and pointing to racism
as a contributing factor to the decision); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-
Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review:
Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1 (1986) (reviewing the Korematsu decision and judicial oversight of
military action for national security).
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the interrelationship of all three theoretical foundations: (1) the connection
between labor and civil liberties; (2) the effects of retrenchment of rights in
times of crisis on bystander groups; and (3) the effects of historical context
on judges. The Free Speech Fights were attempts by the IWW to challenge
restrictions on speech by preaching their gospel of class conflict on
downtown street corners. Although the IWW was a forerunner to the
American Civil Liberties Union, the IWW was not strictly interested in free
speech, but rather "one big union" that would have more leverage with
employers and ultimately challenge the capitalist system.5"
Before the modem conception of freedom of association under the
First Amendment, or its explicit protection in federal statutes and
international law, the effects of denying civil liberties hit workers
particularly hard, oftentimes with direct physical violence. Indeed, some
members of the IWW engaged in violent tactics, but many of its members
simply sought to leverage their power to engage in mass refusals to work.
The IWW broke into two groups, one that advocated a socialist
government, and another that simply wished to enhance bargaining power
through a free-form association and disruptive strikes that were often at
odds with employers and the established American Federation of Labor
(AFL).5
In San Diego, California, government reaction toward the free speech
fights was a typical example of repression toward workers associated with
the IWW. The IWW rhetoric of class struggle was particularly worrisome
to Southern Californians who saw revolution occurring in Mexico in
1911.52 Until that time, the IWW had been tolerated, and even given a
comer in downtown San Diego to engage in free speech. After the
Mexican revolution began, the local government began to crack down on
the IWW and eventually passed an ordinance banning all speech in a forty-
nine block area of downtown.53 When the IWW violated the ordinance,
attempting "to educate the floating and out-of-work population to a true
understanding of the interests of labor as a whole," they were arrested and
brutalized by police.5 4 Citizen vigilantes volunteered to run the IWW out
50. See DIANE GAREY, DEFENDING EVERYBODY: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION 49-52 (1998) (describing the history and formation of the ACLU).
51. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL
WORKERS OF THE WORLD 444 (2d ed. 1988); HOWARD KIMELDORF, BATTLING FOR
AMERICAN LABOR: WOBBLIES, CRAFT WORKERS, AND THE MAKING OF THE UNION
MOVEMENT 49-55 (1999) (explaining how the Philadelphia Local simply wanted to reap the
benefits from the wartime economy).
52. See Rosalie Shanks, The I. W. W. Free Speech Movement: San Diego, 1912, 19 J.
SAN DIEGO HIST. 1 (1973), available at http://www.sandiegohistory.org/journal/73winter/
speech.htm (documenting the events of the IWW in 1912).
53. Id.
54. San Diego Free Speech Fight, 1912, in FELLOW WORKERS AND FRIENDS: I.W.W.
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of town and to prevent more from coming to San Diego.
The constitutional challenge to the San Diego "speech-free" zone was
rejected by a state judge, who cited an appellate court decision sustaining a
Los Angeles ordinance that had been the model for the one in San Diego.55
The appellate court upheld the trial judge's ruling, holding that the
ordinance was within the reasonable discretion of the city. The appellate
court noted that, given the City's power to enact the ordinance, "the
character or object of the assemblages prohibited are of no materiality,
whatever the alleged public benefit they might have had.' 5 6 It would be
decades before similarly overbroad "free-speech-free zones" were seen as
per se violations of the First Amendment.5 7
The IWW was the target of repression by governmental entities at all
levels. This repression reached a climax during World War I. Five months
after the U.S. entered the war in April 1917, federal agents indicted several
IWW leaders nationwide and began a series of show trials in major cities.58
The most celebrated of these trials commenced in a Chicago federal court
in April 1918. The charges consisted of various theories of criminal
conspiracy, including counts of interference with employers' contractual
rights, many of which would be discredited by the time the NLRA passed
in 1935. In this environment, the govermnent's case was largely based on
guilt by association. This tactic proved successful, and the jury rendered a
guilty verdict in the Chicago trial after deliberations lasting less than an
hour. The same result occurred in other conspiracy trials.59
The IWW trial in Chicago was only one element of the government's
strategy to suppress dissent during World War I. As World War I raged
overseas, the trial was part of an overall strategy of muzzling dissenters at
home. It was no coincidence that many of those-who were seen as a threat
to American security were also leaders of radical workers' organizations,
and in many cases they were noncitizens. This dragnet culminated in the
Palmer Raids of 1919 to 1920, under the auspices of Attorney General
FREE-SPEECH FIGHTS AS TOLD BY PARTICIPANTS 131-32 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1981).
55. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 115 (1997).
56. Id. (quoting Ex parte Thomas, 102 P. 19, 20 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1909)).
57. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews For Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (ruling
Los Angeles could not restrict First Amendment activities in its airport terminal).
58. See PATRICK RENSHAW, THE WOBBLIES: THE STORY OF THE IWW AND SYNDICALISM
IN THE UNITED STATES 169-94 (New, rev. ed., Ivan R. Dee ed., 1999) (recounting the IWW
trials); Harold Josephson, Political Justice During the Red Scare: The Trial of Benjamin
Gitlow, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 139 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 2d ed. 1994)
(recounting the history of the trial of Benjamin Gitlow); see also MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE
STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 67 (1994) (explaining Congress' attack on the
IWW); David M. Rabban, The IWW Free Speech Fights and Popular Conceptions of Free
Expression Before World War 1, 80 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1994) (noting that the meaning of
free speech was a subject of popular concern before World War I).
59. RENSHAW, supra note 58.
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Palmer, which resulted in the deportation of noncitizens deemed seditious
to the war effort. Three large labor disputes in 1919-a police strike in
Boston, and strikes in the mining and steel industries-fed into the climate
of fear at the disruptive power of the labor movement.6"
The government quickly recognized how worker organization inter-
fered with wartime objectives, since unregulated strikes during wartime
would hamper the war effort. Anti-syndicalism laws were used to
prosecute IWW activists even after World War I ended.61  These laws
criminalized advocating the overthrow of the government by force or
violence. California's Criminal Syndicalism Act, for example,
criminalized anyone who organized or assisted in organizing, or who
knowingly became "a member of[] any organization, society, group or
assemblage of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid
and abet criminal syndicalism. .. Criminal syndicalism was defined as
"any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the
commission of crime ... or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or control, or effecting any political change.,
63
In 1919, Charlotte Whitney was ensnared in the government's
syndicalist prosecutions for organizing a California branch of the
Communist labor party. Whitney was convicted for signing on to a
statement that approved of strikes in Seattle and Winnipeg which
"commended the propaganda and example of the Industrial Workers of the
World and their struggles and sacrifices in the class war."64 The Supreme
Court upheld Whitney's conviction on the ground that Whitney's
associative activities smacked of "criminal conspiracy., 65 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Brandeis expressed disdain for the fear that the Court
validated in its opinion: "Those who won our independence by revolution
were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty., 66 Justice Brandeis affirmed the conviction
because he believed that the jury could have found criminal intent to
60. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 222 (2004) ("The New York Tribune
warned that thousands of strikers, 'red-soaked in the doctrines of Bolshevism, clamor for the
strike as a means of... starting a general red revolution in America."').
61. Ashutosh M. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: The Power of Ideas, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 411 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). Bhagwat states that the
California statute was typical of the many state statutes "inasmuch as it was wielded
primarily against the Wobblies." Id.
62. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 360 (1927).
63. Id. at 359-60.
64. Id. at364.
65. Id. at 372.
66. Id. at 377.
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engage in unlawful acts, but he did not believe that the breadth of the anti-
syndicalism statute itself could be justified.67
Brandeis's 1927 concurring opinion in Whitney was one of the first
steps toward an expansive view of the First Amendment. 6' Despite the
limits of the First Amendment, the labor movement looked to protect its
freedom of association through federal statute. After mass worker
demonstrations in 1934, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA), which first guaranteed the right to organize. After the right to
organize was protected by law, the more radical elements of the labor
movement were tamed.
The IWW Free Speech Fights and the violent disruption that often
accompanied labor strife show the interrelated nature of the three
theoretical foundations of this Article. Throughout history, there has been
a close connection between the right to speak and assemble and the right to
associate in labor unions. The governmental reaction to the connection has
led to the retrenchment of worker rights at the same time that political
liberties like the right to speak and assemble were being limited. The
violence that sometimes resulted from labor struggles was the product of
both rogue elements within the labor movement and violent reaction by
government officials. During periods of domestic insecurity, the judiciary
has been reluctant to uphold civil liberties and labor rights, instead favoring
governmental power, order, and stability, and the necessity for some
reduction of rights in uncertain times. This dialectical relationship between
labor's freedom of association and concerns about national security has
played out since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
III. THE WAR ON WORKERS WAGED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND
CONGRESS
Although there were several terrorist attacks before 9/11, such as the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the bombing of the USS
Cole in 2000, few would dispute that the 9/11 attacks led to a heightened
sense of insecurity in the nation.69 Soon after the 9/11 attacks, Congress
67. RABBAN, supra note 55, at 370 (quoting Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
68. Id. at 370-71. Brandeis's concurring opinion also laid the groundwork for the
eventual invalidation of anti-syndicalism laws in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(finding the defendant's conviction under the criminal syndicalism laws of Oregon in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) and Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242 (1937) (finding the inmate's conviction in violation of the freedom of speech
and assembly rights of the Fourteenth Amendment).
69. See RENATA L. MACK & MICHAEL J. KELLY, EQUAL JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE:
AMERICA'S LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE EMERGING TERRORIST THREAT 30-32 (2004)
(detailing terrorist attacks since 1975).
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passed the USA PATRIOT Act ostensibly to provide legal tools to fight the
War on Terror. 70 The USA PATRIOT Act gave the government tools to
engage in the kind of "associational" profiling that challenges our
shopworn conceptions of constitutional protections, such as "innocent until
proven guilty" and "judicial review., 7' The increased scrutiny on
immigrants and noncitizens since 9/11 has affected labor's freedom of
association.
Even before 9/11, immigrants in certain associations considered to be
"terrorist organizations" by the U.S. government were singled out for
scrutiny.72 The most famous such case was that of the "LA8," a group of
eight Palestinian immigrants living in Los Angeles who were members of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). They engaged in
fundraising activities ostensibly for the purpose of buying books, food, and
other humanitarian supplies for Palestinian children. The U.S. government
designated PFLP a "terrorist organization" under the Hobbs Act and moved
to deport them.73 A federal judge in Los Angeles found the government's
action to be an unconstitutional infringement on the immigrants' First
Amendment rights because the government had not proven that the
immigrants intended to support any terrorist activities. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the district court's decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, finding that a federal statute passed in 1996
gave the government the authority to deport the immigrants without
judicial review.74 The immigration system continues after 9/11 to be used
to discourage membership in designated associations, even when the
members' goals are purely humanitarian. Thus, the concept of guilt by
mere association, thought vanquished in previous constitutional rulings, 75 is
70. USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. 272. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared By Law:
Post September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2004)
(discussing post-9/11 governmental policies based on race); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R.
Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The
Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 295 (2002) (stating that the federal
government restricted civil liberties to improve national security).
71. See COLE, supra note 39 (discussing guilt by association and the USA PATRIOT
Act); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2d ed. 2002) (arguing that the war on
terror can be fought without secret searches and guilt by association).
72. Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, The Immigration Reform Act, and
Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833 (1997).
73. Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal.
1989). aff'd sub nom. Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 940 F.2d 445
(9th Cir. 1991).
74. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
75. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (stating that bar admission
cannot be restricted through mere membership in a Communist party); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (stating that the Constitution does not forbid teaching or
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alive again after 9/11.
This Article focuses on how the climate of guilt by association has
affected the climate for collective bargaining and the right of workers to
freedom of association in the private and public spheres. In effect, the War
on Terror has become a War on Workers. As will be discussed below, the
USA PATRIOT Act has had both a direct and indirect impact on workers'
rights. The process of retrenchment of rights can be seen in several
examples. Government workers have also felt the reach of the new
paradigm in the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and
efforts to reform the federal personnel system. All of these actions have
been facilitated by the rhetoric of government officials connecting worker
collective actions to national insecurity in the post-9/1 1 world.
A. The USA PA TRIOTAct: Direct and Indirect Effects
The USA PATRIOT Act is a key example of the retrenchment of
rights. It has become a symbol for what many see as the widespread threat
to constitutional liberties in the post-9/l1 era in the name of national
security.76 Some provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act strike broadly at
civil liberties for all Americans. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act
allows "sneak and peek" search warrants, where the subject of the search is
not given notice of the search until after it is conducted. The
constitutionality of these warrants has been strongly questioned by the
courts over the last two decades." The Act also legitimized unprecedented
wiretap sharing between state and local law enforcement and intelligence
78agencies. In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act requires nonprofit
associations, as a condition of receiving deductions from federal employee
advocacy of overthrow of the government as an abstract principle).
76. See generally NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE GATHERING
RESISTANCE 11 (2003) (noting that the Bill of Rights was eroded "when the president signed
the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001"); MACK & KELLY, supra note 69, at 116
(calling the PATRTIOT Act "yet another glimpse of an America tragically surrendering her
democratic principles to the whims of contemporary fears and prejudices"); Jerome M.
Mileur & Ronald Story, America's Wartime Presidents: Politics, National Security and
Civil Liberties, in THE POLITICS OF TERROR: THE U.S. RESPONSE TO 9/11 95, 118-27
(William J. Crotty ed., 2004) (discussing the threat of a surveillance state).
77. NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: How POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-
TERRORISM MEASURES THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES 56 (2002). The courts have been
split on the constitutionality of "sneak and peek" search warrants. Compare United States v.
Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding delayed notification of searches and seizures
of intangible evidence not a violation of the Fourth Amendment), with United States v.
Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding sneak and peek search warrants
unconstitutional) and United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d. Cir. 1993) (holding that
sneak and peek search warrants, while not per se unconstitutional, violated the disclosure
requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41).
78. CHANG, supra note 77 (citing section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act).
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paychecks, to ensure that the employees of the association are not on
terrorist watch lists. 79 Finally, section 805(a)(2)(B) of the Act makes it
illegal to provide "expert advice or training" to terrorist organizations.
This provision was recently declared unconstitutionally vague by a federal
judge in Los Angeles.8 °
By limiting civil liberties, the USA PATRIOT Act has both direct and
indirect effects on workers' rights of association. An example of a direct
effect can be seen in section 802 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
contains a definition of domestic terrorism that could extend to some of the
protest activities of labor unions: "[A]cts dangerous to human life that are
a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State [and]
appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; [or] to
influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion. ,,81 The
broad contours of this new crime could be used to stifle many of the
activities of the labor movement, such as those that occurred at the World
Trade Organization and the G-8 summits in recent years.
Another example of the direct effect on workers' rights is the
provision stating that employers can cooperate with law enforcement
officers seeking access to employee personnel files without violating Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which would otherwise bar any inquiry
based on race, religion or national origin. These examples illustrate how
workers' rights become precarious when civil liberties are decreased
because labor's freedom of association is so intrinsically intertwined with
core civil liberties.82
The post-9/11 environment and the USA PATRIOT Act have also had
many indirect effects on labor. In order for workers to be able to exercise
their right to organize effectively, they must be able to associate without
fear of surveillance by their employers. This is why it is a violation of
federal labor law for employers to engage in surveillance or create the
impression of surveillance. 83
79. Controversy over participation in the watch list program recently erupted within the
American Civil Liberties Union board. Adam Liptak, A.C.L. U. Board Is Split Over Watch
Lists, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at Al.
80. David Rosenzweig, U.S. Judge Voids Portion of Patriot Act as Illegally Vague,
L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A19.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (Supp. 2001).
82. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 13-III(B)(1), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/national-origin.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (prohibiting review of
employment decisions based on national origin if those decisions were made in the interest
of national security).
83. See Dayton Hudson Corp., 316 N.L.R.B. 477, 488 (1995) ("It is well established
that, absent legitimate justification, an employer's videotaping or photographing of its
employees, while they are engaged in protected concerted activities, constitutes unlawful
surveillance, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act."); see also Palagonia Bakery Co.,
Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. No. 74 1, 32 (2003) (holding that following employees to a union
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The USA PATRIOT Act has facilitated forms of employer
surveillance. In fact, the Act changed the definition of when a
communication is "stored" in the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in
order to more easily obtain voice mail communications for law enforce-
ment purposes.84 This change meant that employers would also be freer to
intercept electronic communications about associational activities. In
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Robert Konop created and maintained a
website where he posted negative comments about Hawaiian Airlines and
his union.8' The company intercepted communications to and from the
website, and Konop filed a lawsuit under the SCA against Hawaiian
Airlines. The district court dismissed Konop's SCA claim, and he appealed
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The amendment of the SCA by the
USA PATRIOT Act, among other factors, caused a panel of the Ninth
Circuit to withdraw its original opinion finding in favor of Konop on the
SCA claim and issue a new opinion affirming the trial court's summary
judgment against Konop on that claim. The court pointed to Congress's
intent to reduce the protection provided to voice mail so that it would have
the same form of protection as other forms of electronic communications.86
The change in law also meant that Konop's anti-employer, anti-union
communications could legally be intercepted if they were in electronic
storage, rather than in electronic transit. The upshot of the Konop case is
that any federal claims that employees might have had for violation of the
privacy of their electronic association activities are now more difficult after
the PATRIOT Act.
Private employers are using the threat of terrorism as a reason to
increase monitoring of worker activity, which may chill the exercise of
freedom of association in the workplace.87 As one commentator put it, "[a]
variety of indirect effects on unions and bargaining may also arise" in the
airline industry, particularly from the greater tensions imposed by
government mandates such as background checks, self-defense and
passenger threat assessment.88
The USA PATRIOT Act has created an environment in which it is
acceptable to reduce rights in the name of national security. Employers
meeting is surveillance in violation of § 8(a)(1)); Huck Store Fixture Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 119,
128 (2001) (holding that giving the impression that employees' attendance at union
meetings would be under surveillance was a violation of section 8(a)(1)).
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (Supp. 2001).
85. 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
86. Id. at 878.
87. Michael L. Triplett, As Employee Monitoring Expands, Attention Turns to
Information, Policies, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Mar. 10, 2005, at C2.
88. John Delaney, Contemporary Developments in and Challenges to Collective
Bargaining in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 502, 524
(John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds., 2003).
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may feel that surveillance cameras and even global positioning system
tracking is necessary to respond to the threat of terrorism. This may lead to
unlawful surveillance under the NLRA, improperly justified by "national
security." Recent cases at the NLRB, discussed in Part IV below, suggest
that this argument may carry a great deal of weight with the current NLRB.
In addition, as rights for one group are limited, it is easier to legitimize a
retrenchment of rights for other groups. The following sections will show
how the Executive Branch and Congress's War on Terror has led to a War
on Workers.
B. West Coast Port Dispute: Limitations on the Right to Bargain
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 gives the President authority to end a
strike or lockout if it "will imperil the national health or safety."8 9 Though
the courts usually defer to the government on what constitutes a threat to
"national health and safety," the government has not always successfully
made that showing. For example, in 1978, President Jimmy Carter invoked
Taft-Hartley's provisions to obtain a temporary restraining order against a
strike in the coal mines in the midst of the energy crisis, but the injunction
was dissolved eight days later after the district court found that the risk to
the nation's health and safety was not grave enough to justify issuance of
the permanent injunction. 90
Despite the Carter administration's failure to obtain an injunction,
courts have consistently deferred to the judgment of the Executive Branch
in obtaining injunctions under the Act in construing the terms "national
health" and "safety."9' For example, in U.S. v. Portland Longshoremen's
Benevolent Society, Local No. 861, the court held that "national health"
meant economic health, which included effects on employment, on the
nation's balance of payments, or on the delivery of food.92 A report by the
89. 29 U.S.C. § 178(a)(ii) (2000). The Railway Labor Act, which applies to railroads
and airlines, has emergency procedures that require the President to show only that the labor
dispute will "threaten substantially to interrupt interstate commerce." 45 U.S.C. § 160
(2000).
90. Jeanne Cummings, US. Judge Swiftly Orders End to Lockout at U.S. Ports, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 9, 2002, at Al.
91. See National Administrative Office Report, Emergency Procedures for Resolving
Labor-Management Disputes in the United States, Canada and Mexico (Sept. 2000),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/EmergencyProcedures.htm
[hereinafter NAO Report] (discussing the laws and procedures in the United States, Canada,
and Mexico that are utilized in the event of special emergencies or extraordinary
circumstances associated with labor disputes); see also Michael H. Leroy & John H.
Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injunction: National Emergency Strikes Under the Taft-
Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to Strike, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 63 (2001) (exploring the
decline of workers' collective actions over the past sixty-five years).
92. 336 F. Supp. 504 (D. Me. 1971) (holding a maritime strike as a threat to national
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National Administrative Office states that the courts' conception of
national safety has included activities that affect, delay, or inconvenience
the military, NASA, the Atomic Energy Commission, or NATO allies and
other security groups.93 Thus, the government need not wait until national
health or safety is actually impaired for an injunction to issue; the fact that
the national health or safety would be or could be affected has been enough
for many courts.94
After 9/11, the Bush administration expanded the interpretation of
"national health and safety" to include the War on Terror. The 2002
contract negotiations between shipping companies and the International
Longshore and Warehouseworkers Union (ILWU) focused on
technological changes that threatened the job security of ILWU members.
The dispute festered to a stalemate, with both sides unable to reach an
agreement for weeks. Ultimately, it resulted in a lockout, which led to
boats stacking up on loading docks while perishable goods were spoiling.
On October 9, 2002, President Bush used the emergency powers of the
Taft-Hartley Act to send the longshore workers back to work. In seeking
an injunction from the federal court in San Francisco, the administration
leaned heavily on its characterization of the nation being in the middle of
war, stating: "[A]n extended shutdown of the West Coast ports would have
a substantial negative impact on the military's readiness during a time of
national crisis."95 In an October 7, 2002 statement, Secretary. of Labor
Elaine Chao also said that the shutdown would have grave effects on the
nation's military operations:
The shutdown . . . has serious consequences for our national
defense. America's military relies on commercial ships, docking
at West Coast ports, to supply our armed forces. Any disruption
in the flow of these military shipments could significantly impact
the Defense Department's ability to support our men and women
in harm's way.
health). See also United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 293 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (discussing the term "national health"); NAO Report, supra note 91.
93. NAO Report, supra note 91.
94. See United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 246 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (granting preliminary injunction against maritime strike because national
health or safety could be imperiled).
95. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, United States v. Pac. Mar.
Ass'n (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ilwu/
uspmailwu 1 0902gbrf.pdf.
96. Press Statement, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Statement by U.S. Secretary Elaine L. Chao
on Presidential Action on the West Coast Ports Dispute (Oct. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/OPA2002576.htm.
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At the time, the war in Iraq had not yet begun, and major fighting in
Afghanistan had ceased months earlier. Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, in his declaration filed in support of the injunction,
averred that the dispute "jeopardize[s] the defense effort and the Global
War on Terrorism.,
97
The district court granted the government's request for an injunction,
finding that the government had met its burden of showing a threat to
national health and safety. 9 This was in spite of the fact that the ILWU
and the association representing the shipping companies, the Pacific
Maritime Association (PMA), had reached an agreement to load essential
military cargo during the labor dispute. In his written order granting the
preliminary injunction, United States District Judge William Alsup
dismissed this agreement as a way of preserving military readiness, finding
that it was too difficult to determine and segregate essential military
cargo. 99  In addition to rejecting the creative solution that the parties
reached with regard to essential military cargo, the court sua sponte
extended the injunction to include "any future strike or other work slow-
downs by a union," even though it was the shippers who first locked out the
union.'00 "In short," Judge Alsup stated, "at a time when our nation is at
war with international terrorists and when our national defense system must
be fully prepared, the sustained closure of West Coast ports would imperil
the national safety."' 0 '
Seen in the broader economic and political context, the government's
interest in ending the port dispute was not solely driven by concerns over
national security and national safety-the United States faces a massive
trade deficit and technological changes at the ports could help reduce labor
costs and increase productivity and profits. These underlying economic
reasons were likely the main motivators behind the government's actions.
However, terrorism concerns were the primary way to legitimize the action
and gain public support. The West Coast port dispute shows how the
retrenchment of rights theory intertwines many complex factors to justify
97. Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 95 (quoting Declaration of
Donald H. Rumsfeld 4). In paragraph three of his declaration, Secretary Rumsfeld
admitted that the military was more dependent than ever on commercial shipping because it
no longer kept large inventories of its own but depended on "just-in-time" deliveries from
commercial suppliers.
98. United States v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
99. Id. at 1014.
100. Id. at 1015. The injunction was the first to apply the emergency powers to a
lockout, though the shippers argued that the lockout was occasioned by the union's
slowdown. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKiN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 501 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing court cases
regarding the employers' duty to bargain).
101. Pac. Mar. Ass'n., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1014-15.
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restrictions on labor rights.
Six weeks after the judge's injunction opened the ports, the union and
the shippers reached an agreement. The union won some concessions on
pay and pensions for the dockworkers but generally gave management a
free hand to implement technological changes. Although the labor dispute
ended quickly, thanks to the Taft-Hartley injunction, whether or not the
injunction should have been granted at all remains open to debate. What
seems clear is that the Bush administration will use the War on Terror as a
justification for "national health and safety" injunctions, even when there is
no war being actively waged in foreign lands.
C. Airport Screeners Struggle for the Right to Bargain
After 9/11, the U.S. government scrambled to reorganize to meet the
challenges posed by the threat of international terrorism. Many placed the
blame for allowing hijackers through security with box-cutters on the
system of privately-contracted security. Before 9/11, airports usually did
not hire their own workers to screen passengers and luggage. Instead, their
contractors hired workers at low wages, which caused low morale and
attracted a large number of noncitizens. However, in the years before 9/11,
some airport screeners had seen recent improvements in their working
conditions. Organized labor had made some airports, such as Los Angeles
International Airport, the target of organizing and living wage
campaigns.10 2 Many of these workers had been organized by the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU), known for its innovative "Justice
for Janitors" campaigns.
0 3
In response to the intense scrutiny of airport security workers,
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001
("Security Act"), which placed the responsibility for airport security under
a new federal agency called the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA).' 04 The TSA became part of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), which was created in 2002.05 The DHS also included the Bureau
102. Jim Newton & Tracy Johnson, Union Rally Seeks Higher Pay for Airport Workers,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B1 (recounting the union officials' argument that paying
security personnel more ensures passenger safety); John Seeley, Flying High: More Money
for Airport Workers, L.A. WEEKLY, Dec. 22-28, 2000 (describing approval of LAX
workers' landmark three-year contract), available at http://www.laweekly.com/ink/01/05/
news-seeley.php.
103. Catherine L. Fisk et al., Union Representation of Immigrant Janitors in Southern
California: Economic and Legal Challenges, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE
CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 199 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000).
104. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597 (2001).
105. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), whose goals were
controlling borders, responding to emergencies, processing immigration
applications and communicating threat information.
0 6
This new structure requires all airport security screeners to be federal
employees, which means they must be U.S. citizens or nationals. This also
limits the airport screeners' ability to strike because the screeners can only
join a federal union, which does not have the same ability to strike as
private sector unions. Notwithstanding the slim possibility of an illegal
strike, federal control of airport screening essentially means that a militant
private sector union like SEIU will not represent airport workers. Thus, the
possibility for innovative private sector organizing has been curtailed by
the federal takeover of airport security.
The ability of TSA workers to join any union is still in doubt because
the Bush administration moved to exclude them from collective bargaining.
Section 7112(b)(6) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Act (FSLMRA) allows agencies to exclude individual workers from
bargaining units on national security grounds. 10 7  James Loy, Under
Secretary of the Transportation Security Agency, issued a directive stating
that federally employed security screeners "shall not . . . be entitled to
engage in collective bargaining or be represented for the purpose of
engaging in such bargaining by any representative or organization."' °
Airport security workers in the TSA have taken their claims to the
Federal Labor Relations Authority and the federal courts but have so far
been rebuffed.'0 9 Shortly after the TSA was established, the American
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) applied to the Federal
Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to be the exclusive bargaining
representative of the TSA airport screeners. The FLRA held that union
representation of TSA screeners was foreclosed by: (1) section 111 (d) of
the Security Act, which provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security may
employ, appoint, discipline, terminate, and fix the compensation, terms,
and conditions of employment of Federal service for [federally employed
security screeners]";"0 and (2) the directive written by Loy, which stated
that the screeners "shall not, as a term or condition of their employment, be
entitled to engage in collective bargaining or be represented for the purpose
106. See MACK & KELLY, supra note 69, at 169 (describing the responsibilities of the
newly created DHS).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(6) (2000).
108. AFGE v. Loy, 367 F.3d 932, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
109. Id. See Washington in Brief: Union Loses Ruling on Airport Screeners, WASH.
POST, Sept. 6, 2003, at A04 (describing the rejection by a federal court of a claim by a
federal employees' union for the right to join unions).
110. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597, 620 (2001).
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of engaging in such bargaining by any representative or organization.""'
AFGE appealed the decision of the FLRA to the federal district court
and included a constitutional claim. The District Court for the District of
Columbia dismissed both claims." 2 The election decision was dismissed
because the court found that it was a decision that may only be reviewed by
a court of appeals. The constitutional claim was dismissed because the
court held that it lacked jurisdiction, though the court did ultimately render
an opinion rejecting the constitutional claims because neither the First nor
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gave the screeners the right
to bargain with the government. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed on both grounds, holding that the FLRA decision was not properly
appealed to the district court and that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because the constitutional issues were not properly raised with the
FLRA. 13 With the prospects for relief in Congress and the courts nearly
exhausted, AFGE has a complaint pending with the International Labor
Organization, arguing that the exclusion from collective bargaining violates
international principles of freedom of association.'14
D. A New Face for Federal Personnel Systems
Regardless of whether employees are in security-sensitive positions or
not, the government has come to view any collective bargaining as in
conflict with national security. The Bush administration has made the
freedom to hire and fire at will a national security priority. As such, the
administration sought to eliminate collective bargaining from DHS as part
of the authorizing legislation, but labor's allies in Congress thwarted the
administration's efforts for several months in 2002. It was not until
November 2002, after Republicans gained majorities in both houses of
Congress, that the DHS statute finally passed." 5 In the end, the legislation
111. Loy, 367 F.3d at 934.
112. AFGE v. Loy, 281 F. Supp. 2d 59,66 (D.D.C. 2003).
113. 367 F.3d at 934.
114. Press Release, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, In an
International Forum, AFGE Charges Bush Administration with Violations of International
Labor Law (Aug. 14, 2003), available at http://www.afge.org/Index.cfin?Page=
PressReleases&PressReleaselD=270.
115. See Taryn M. Byrne & Gary L. Tomasulo, Executive Power, National Security &
Federal Employee Collective Bargaining Rights: The New Department of Homeland
Security, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 293, 295 (2003) (explaining how the impasse over
the national security exemption was overcome once Senate Republicans gained majority
control in 2002); Michael Hayes, Improving Security Through Reducing Employee Rights,
10 lus GENTIUM 49 (2004), available at http://law.ubalt.edu/ciclilt/IUI0_2004.pdf
(describing the much broader authority given to the President under the Homeland Security
Act to waive collective bargaining rights of federal employees); Joseph Slater, Homeland
Security vs. Workers Rights? What the Federal Government Should Learn From History
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gave authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of
the Office of Personnel Management to establish a new human resources
management system within DHS, including the authority to waive or
modify the existing labor relations system."
6
There are certain justifiable limits on collective bargaining and
freedom of association for some government workers. For example, police
officers, military personnel, and fire fighters are denied the right to strike as
a matter of public safety." 7 In addition, the President has long had the
authority to remove the right to union representation if the President
determines that: (1) the employees work for an entity with the primary
function of intelligence, investigative, or national security work; and (2)
representation rights cannot be applied in a manner consistent with national
security."'
However, the new Homeland Security Act frees the President from the
stricture of the two-part test above if the President decides that the
suspension of bargaining rights is "necessary in the interest of national
security."" 9 This would potentially deny collective bargaining rights to all
of the employees of DHS, from the clerical employees up to the Secretary
of Homeland Security.120  The administration has used the rubric of
national security to get "flexibility," even though there is no evidence that
managerial flexibility promotes national security.
DHS employees were not the only government workers to have their
collective bargaining rights threatened. Workers at the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA) were told that their union was inconsistent
with national security. NIMA, created from eight defense and intelligence
agencies in 1996, employs cartographers, digital imaging specialists, data
management specialists, and others. The administration believes NIMA
has evolved into full-time intelligence work directly affecting national
and Experience, and Why, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295, 309 (2004) (discussing the
political haggling over the President's powers in the proposed legislation).
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 9701(a) (2000) (authorizing notification of the existing labor
relations system).
117. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, JUNE WEISBERGER & MARTIN H. MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT 82-83 (2004).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1) (2000).
119. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(2) (2000).
120. See Neil Fox, PATCO and the Courts: Public Sector Labor Law as Ideology, U.
ILL. L. REV. 245, 261 (1985) (discussing the ideology of strikes as disloyal, traitorous
rebellions); see also JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
UNIONS, THE LAW AND THE STATE, 1900-1962 37 (2004) (providing newspaper accounts of a
1919 Boston police strike described as a "revolt"); Slater, supra note 115 (discussing the
denial of collective bargaining rights for federal employees); Molly Seizer, Federalization of
Airport Security Workers: A Study of the Practical Impact of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act from a Labor Law Perspective, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363
(2003) (discussing the denial of bargaining rights for federal airport security workers).
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security."' The Bush administration also studied the Departments of
Defense and Justice to determine whether or not national security was
consistent with collective bargaining. In November 2003, Congress
granted Defense Secretary Rumsfeld the authority to establish the National
Security Personnel System (NSPS) at the Department of Defense (DOD).1
22
This legislation gave the DOD the authority to promulgate regulations to
provide greater authority over civilian employees in the defense department
in order to "strike back at terrorists. 123  The authority to promulgate
regulations implementing the new "streamlined" personnel system at the
DOD caused concern among leaders of unions who believe that the
department leader's ultimate goal is to eliminate unions entirely. 124
The efforts to reform the federal personnel system to fight the War on
Terror culminated in new regulations for the DHS and the DOD in the
spring of 2005. Final regulations articulating the new personnel system for
DHS, as well as proposed regulations for DOD, were released in February
2005. The new DHS personnel policies significantly limit a DHS
employee's freedom of association. The regulations begin by sounding a
theme of national sacrifice:
Since September 11, 2001, this Nation has come together with a
unity of purpose that has not been seen or felt since the attack at
Pearl Harbor in 1941. Out of that national tragedy emerged a
consensus for a comprehensive global war on terrorism. That
consensus resulted in the enactment of legislation creating the
Department of Homeland Security, and with it, the authority to
create a system for managing its human resources that would be
flexible and mission-focused without compromising the
principles of merit and fitness.
125
In order to fulfill its mission, the new system is intended to "provide for
greater flexibility and accountability in the way employees are paid,
developed, evaluated, afforded due process, and represented by labor
121. Stephen Barr, National Security Concerns Wipe Out Union Rights at Mapping
Agency, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2003, at B2.
122. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, §
1101, 117 Stat. 1392, 1401 (2003).
123. Christopher Lee, Rumsfeld Gains Latitude on Rules for Civilian Workers, WASH.
POST, Nov. 8, 2003, at A3.
124. See Stephen Barr, Unions Ask Help of Congress on Pentagon's New Civil Service
System, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2004, at B2 ("I don't use the term loosely-it is union busting.
They don't want unions anymore in the Department of Defense." (quoting Gregory
Junemann, president of the International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers)).
125. Department of Homeland Security Human Resources Management System
[hereinafter DHS HRMS], 70 Fed. Reg. 5272, 5273 (Feb. 1, 2005) (to be codified at 5
C.F.R. pt. 9701).
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organizations.' 26  In a society that is increasingly suspicious of
noncitizens, the regulations more closely circumscribe noncitizen worker
rights. For one, noncitizens are excluded from collective bargaining.
27
Additionally, noncitizens are excluded from typical civil service
protections against adverse disciplinary actions. 128
Most decisions of the DHS Secretary take effect immediately, with
bargaining issues resolved only after the decision is reached. Many
policies and procedures will be established through implementing
directives, which are not subject to bargaining but which must be accorded
the force and effect of the law. Several review boards consisting of
members appointed by the DHS Secretary are established to preside over
issues previously handled by the Federal Labor Relations Authority and the
Merit Systems Protection Board. Unfair labor practice charges may only
be filed if they cannot be handled through the Department's appeals
process.
The right to bargain, and the free exchange of information that makes
bargaining meaningful, is also limited by the DHS regulations. Employees
engaged in intelligence, investigative, or security work that "directly affects
national security" may not be included in any bargaining unit. DHS has
broad discretion in determining what information must be shared with the
labor organizations when requested. The justification for the increased
regulation of civilian employees, like so much other rhetoric since 9/11, is
placed in militaristic terms:
Department managers, supervisors, and employees are on the
frontlines of the war on terrorism and the efforts to preserve
homeland security. The Department must be able to rely on the
judgment and ability of these managers and supervisors to make
day-to-day decisions--even if this means deviating from
established or negotiated procedures. The reality in the
Department today is that such deviations would be constant,
thereby rendering any negotiated procedures meaningless.
Moreover, the Department's managers and supervisors must be
able to make split-second decisions to deal with operational
realities free of arbitrarily imposed standards. 2 9
While the proposed regulations for the DOD drew from the newly
enacted regulations for DHS, the DOD regulations go further. The decision
to negotiate with a union above the level of exclusive recognition rests with
the Secretary and is not subject to review or statutory dispute resolution
procedures. While unions may request to negotiate at a level above
126. Id.
127. DHS HRMS, supra note 125, at 5333.
128. Id. at 5342.
129. Id. at 5279.
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recognition, the Department has sole and exclusive discretion to grant the
labor organization's requests. 130  Unions representing Department of
Defense workers brought a lawsuit against the government alleging that the
implementation of the new personnel system should have been
negotiated. 3' While a federal judge in the District of Columbia recently
opined during a hearing that the government should have negotiated the
changes with the affected unions, the changes were implemented in
October 2005.132
Despite what seem to be naked attempts by the government to assert
its power as employer, the regulations make it clear that the Bush
administration sees the new paradigm as non-negotiable: "The attacks of
September 11 made it clear that flexibility is not a policy preference. It is
nothing less than an absolute requirement and it must become the
foundation of DOD civilian human resources management."' 33 However,
President Bush began to implement many of his policies before the 9/11
attacks in February 2001, with a report by the conservative Heritage
Foundation as the blueprint. 3 4  The report, entitled Taking Charge of
Federal Personnel, was released on January 10, 2001 and argued for the
end of labor management relationships that President Clinton had created
through Executive Order 12,871.' On February 17, 2001, President
George W. Bush repealed Executive Order 12,871, ending the mandatory
labor management partnerships that had been created by Clinton. The
executive orders revoking union rights came in rapid succession after
9/11-taking away the right to bargain from clerical employees in certain
U.S. Attorneys' offices, removing air traffic control from the list of
"inherently governmental functions" not subject to privatization, and
130. National Security Personnel System (NSPS), 70 Fed. Reg. 7552, 7572 (Feb. 14,
2005) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 9901).
131. See Jane M. Von Bergen, Ten Unions Sue Rumsfeld, Allege Talks Weren't Held,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 24, 2005, at C1 (describing the lawsuit brought by ten labor
unions representing 300,000 civilian employees challenging the refusal to negotiate the
National Security Personnel System).
132. Louis C. LaBrecque, DOD Unveils Final Personnel System Rule Covering 650,000
Workers; Unions Plan Suit, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Oct. 28, 2005, at A-8. A coalition of
unions from the Department of Defense filed suit on November 7, 2005. See United
Department of Defense Workers Coalition Home Page, http://www.uniteddodworkerscoaliti
on.org (announcing suit filed to block NSPS).
133. NSPS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 7553.
134. See Martin H. Malin, Public Sector Labor Law Doctrine and Labor-Management
Cooperation, in GOING PUBLIC: THE ROLE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN
DELIVERING QUALITY GOVERNMENT SERVICEs 267, 277-78 (Jonathan Brock & David B.
Lipsky eds., 2003) (discussing a Heritage Foundation report urging President Bush to create
a command and control approach to personnel management).
135. George Nesterczuk et al., Taking Charge of Federal Personnel, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, No. 1404, Jan. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovermentReform/BG 1404.cfm.
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starting the battle over collective bargaining in the Department of
Homeland Security.'36
These efforts to limit federal workers' freedom of association in the
name of national security aptly illustrate the theoretical concepts in this
Article. These limitations on workers' rights are another step in the
retrenchment of rights resulting from 9/11. The events of 9/11 and the War
on Terror are used rhetorically as direct reasons for the limitations imposed
by the new and proposed regulations. Of course, the Bush administration
might have favored limiting collective bargaining rights for federal workers
in the absence of the War on Terror. The events of 9/11 merely provide a
convenient pretext for the new rules, as does rhetoric that connects union
activities with national instability.
E. The Rhetorical Move: Collective Bargaining and Terrorism
Language is a powerful way of shaping attitudes in the post-9/11
era. 37 Besides claiming that collective bargaining was inconsistent with
national security, the rhetoric of many government officials since 9/11 has
equated collective bargaining with terrorism in much the same way that
private employers have equated unions with terrorists in the past.
138
Government officials historically have also made connections between
terrorism and collective bargaining demands. These connections have best
served employer purposes at times of national insecurity brought on by
national crises like the Iran hostage crisis and 9/11.
Terrorism took center stage in late 1979 when sixty-six Americans
were held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Iran. Although President
Carter's administration worked for the release of the hostages during his
term, they were not freed until President Reagan took office on January 20,
136. See Exec. Order No. 13,252, 67 Fed. Reg. 1601 (Jan. 7, 2002) (prohibiting
collective bargaining in five subdivisions of the Department of Justice: the criminal
division of the Department, the U.S. Attorneys' offices, the National Drug Intelligence
Center, INTERPOL, and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review); Exec. Order No.
13,189, 66 Fed. Reg. 5421 (Jan. 19, 2001); Malin, supra note 134, at 278 (explaining how
the order stripped certain employees of their collective bargaining rights).
137. See CHRISTOPHER R. MARTIN, FRAMED! LABOR AND THE CORPORATE MEDIA 16
(Cornell University Press 2004) (describing how the media vilified the PATCO strike);
GEOFFREY NUNBERG, GOING NUCULAR: LANGUAGE, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN
CONFRONTATIONAL TIMES (Public Affairs 2004) (explaining how language is used to evoke
emotions in times of war); Amy Kaplan, Homeland Insecurities: Transformation of
Language and Space, in SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? 55 (Mary L.
Dudziak ed., 2003) (describing new words that have entered the vocabulary since 9/11).
138. See, e.g., Am. Meat Packing Corp., 301 N.L.R.B. 835 (1991) (accusing the union of
"terrorism"); Loose Leaf Hardware, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 619 (1983) (showing an employer
discredited unionization as "tyranny backed by terrorism"); Moore-Lowery Flour Mills Co.,
21 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1940) (claiming the union was engaging in "mad-dog terrorism").
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1981. The national vulnerability shown by the hostage crisis led the
Reagan Administration to draw a hard line in the Cold War with alleged
terrorists. In a speech welcoming the hostages back to the United States on
January 27, 1981, President Reagan declared his administration's approach
to dealing with terrorists:
Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international
behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and
effective retribution. We hear it said that we live in an era of
limit to our powers. Well, let it also be understood, there are
limits to our patience. 139
A few months later, it was clear that the Reagan administration's hard
line stance was not limited to terrorists. Soon after the release of the
hostages, negotiations between the federal government and the Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) simmered, eventually
boiling over on June 22, 1981 when 95.3% of PATCO's members rejected
the Federal Aviation Administration's final offer. 140 A strike deadline was
set for 7 a.m. on August 3, 1981, despite the common knowledge among
the workers and organizers that the strike would be illegal.
14
1
When the strike began as planned on August 3, the President warned
that anyone not reporting to work within forty-eight hours would be fired.
The Iran crisis was fresh in everyone's mind as the administration promised
that it would not be held hostage by unreasonable demands.142  This
sentiment was explicitly stated in some of the numerous judicial opinions
that came out of the strike. In one case, the judicial opinion stated, "The
scheme of the strike was that the convenience of the nation's 265 million
citizens would be held hostage to the Union's demands.' 43
139. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for the Freed
American Hostages (Jan. 27, 1981), http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/
12781b.htm.
140. Herbert R. Northrup, The Rise and Demise of PATCO, in PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR
RELATIONS: ANALYSIS AND READINGS 240, 251 (David Lewin et al. eds., 1977).
141. The illegality of the strike was certainly one of the factors contributing to the lack
of support PATCO received from other unions. Others have argued, however, that labor's
unwillingness to engage in such "civil disobedience" is one of the major reasons for the
decline of the labor movement. See STANLEY ARONOWITZ, FROM THE ASHES OF THE OLD:
AMERICAN LABOR AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 82 (1998) (arguing that the failure of the
PATCO strike led public employee unions in the 1980's to seek accommodation with
Republican administrations).
142. See Bernard D. Meltzer & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive
Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 763 (1983) (describing
the strong backlash against lawbreakers that resulted from the Iranian hostage crisis); see
also ART SHOSTAK & DAVE SKOCIK, THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' CONTROVERSY:
LESSONS FROM THE PATCO STRIKE (Human Science Press 1986) (describing Reagan's
hostility towards the PATCO leaders).
143. PATCO v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring).
316 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:2
Despite having little support from the public or the rest of the labor
movement, a large number of traffic controllers refused to return to work.
These workers were fired but were eventually given the right of re-
employment in other federal jobs. The union, on the other hand, did not
survive. 144 While there is certainly room to question the wisdom of the
union's strategy, the administration's hard line stance was facilitated by the
nation's recent experience with the hostage crisis. The administration
failed to realize, however, that simply extending collective bargaining
rights to public employees does not necessarily lead to more strikes.
145
Even when public employees have engaged in legal strikes, their
demands have been seen as disloyal during periods of national insecurity.
When government employees in Minnesota decided to go on strike in the
months following 9/11, they were called unpatriotic and selfish. 146  In
addition, when the National Education Association leveled criticism against
the Bush Administration's No Child Left Behind Act in February 2004, the
Secretary of Education called the nation's largest teachers' union a
"terrorist organization."
147
Recently, lawmakers even made a connection between "weapons of
mass destruction" and private sector union organizers in a hearing about the
practice of "salting." Salting is the practice of union organizers applying
for jobs with the intention of organizing the employees of the company. In
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that
union organizers who suffer retaliation for salting are protected by the
NLRA just like any other employee.1 48  Due to the Supreme Court's
decision protecting the practice and the increasing use of salting by unions
144. See Nelson Lichtenstein, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR
(Princeton University Press 2002) (demonstrating the spectacular destruction of PATCO by
the Reagan administration).
145. Martin H. Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 313 (1993) (studying the 1984 laws giving the right to strike to
government workers in Illinois and Ohio).
146. Steven Greenhouse, Some Workers Are Finding It a Difficult Time to Strike, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at A22; Bill Salisbury, War Threat May Avert Strike: Concerns that
Seemed Weighty Pale Against Terrorist Attack on U.S., ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 23,
2001, at C 1.
147. See Nick Anderson, Paige Calls Teachers Union a "Terrorist Organization, " L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at A15 ("Education Secretary Rod Paige lashed out at the nation's
largest teacher's union, calling the 2.7 million-member National Education Assn. a 'terrorist
organization."'); Sam Dillon & Diana Jean Schemo, Union Urges Bush to Replace
Education Chief Over Remark, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A15; Michele Jacklin, Who's
Afraid of the Teachers Union?, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 3, 2004, at A13 ("U.S.
Education Secretary called the union representing teachers a 'terrorist organization."'); Bob
Leonard, Forget bin Laden; Get the Teachers, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, Mar. 1, 2004,
at A II ("National Education Secretary called the nation's largest teachers union, NEA, a
terrorist organization.").
148. 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
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that are denied other access to employees, the Congressional Subcommittee
on Workforce, Empowerment, and Government Programs of the Small
Business Committee held hearings on salting in June 2005. At the hearing,
Iowa Republican Steve King, who co-sponsored a bill called the Truth in
Employment Act, called salting "an economic weapon of mass
destruction."'' 49  King also called salting "immoral" and "a subversive
tactic. '
These rhetorical flourishes, whether used by government employers,
politicians, or private employers, are likely to further the connections
between unions and terrorism and validate the denial of freedom of
association and collective bargaining. The fact that many immigrants are
active in unions today, and that unions are one of the primary forums for
association in the United States, will lead to more suspicion for unions in
the post-9/11 era. 5 ' Further, the notion of strikes being traitorous, disloyal
rebellions is further cemented in the minds of the public.1 2 Such rhetoric
makes it easier to justify the denial of labor's freedom of association.
153
The foregoing part shows that presidential and congressional actions
since 9/11 have limited labor's freedom of association. These moves might
have occurred absent 9/11, but the terrorist attacks gave a new justification
for these limitations. The rhetoric connecting collective bargaining with
terrorism served to further cement in the public mind the connection
between domestic instability and strikes, demonstrations and picketing.
This connection has also surfaced in the way that judges and administrative
decision-makers have reached and justified labor law decisions since 9/11.
149. Rep. King Says His Anti-Salting Bill Would Combat Unfair Economic Weapon,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), June 22, 2005, at A-12.
150. Id.
151. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, in SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A
WATERSHED MOMENT? 147 (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003) (detailing the increase of hate
crimes after 9/11).
152. See Fox, supra note 120 (illustrating how strikes are perceived as evil); see also
Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the "Un-American" Labor Law, 82
N.C. L. REv. 1705, 1757 (2004) (describing how the perception of a disloyal worker in the
public's mind is an obstacle to union goals).
153. The rhetoric surrounding the recent passage of the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) also leaned heavily on national security. The view that CAFTA was
crucial to national security may have tipped the balance toward passage in the 217-to-215
House of Representatives vote. Jim Abrams, In Bush Win, House Narrowly Approves
CAFTA, Associated Press, July 28, 2005, available at WESTLAW, Westlaw Directory,
APNEWS database ("In the end, it was the national security argument-that rejection of the
deal would further impoverish the region, undermine their democracies and exacerbate the
flow of illegal immigrants into the United States-that appeared to persuade some wavering
members.").
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON LABOR LAW ADJUDICATION
Not all of the effects on labor's freedom of association since 9/11 have
been a result of direct actions by Congress and the Executive Branch. The
government also acts as an adjudicator and a contractor with private
employers. The uncertain times of the post 9/11 period have left their
imprint on legal decisions, with the War on Terror being used as a
justification for decisions that weaken labor's freedom of association. The
legal remedies available to the National Labor Relations Board when it
prosecutes unfair labor practices against immigrant workers were
considerably weakened by the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB in the months after 9/11 1154 If immigrant
workers are deterred from the exercise of federal labor law, freedom of
association for all workers also will be chilled.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court's Hoffman Decision and its Effects on
Immigrant Workers
The 9/11 attacks have affected immigrant workers in many ways,
including increased border enforcement making it difficult for authorized
workers to get across borders. 5 5 Another immediate impact of the attacks
was the scuttling of talks between the United States and Mexico for a
possible amnesty or guestworker program, though activity in that regard
has recently increased. 56 Immigration has been linked in the public mind
to terrorism, and both the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act contained several provisions that targeted immigrants.'57 The
154. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
155. See David Bacon, After 9/11, Immigrant Workers in the Crosshairs, Dec. 15, 2002,
http://dbacon.igc.org/Imgrants/15WrkrsInCrosshairs.htm (criticizing the government for
placing the blame on immigrant workers for 9/11); David Bacon, Casualties of "Security":
One Year of War on Immigrant Workers, http://www.americas.org/item_95 (chronicling the
hardships of immigrant workers as the United States government cracks down on all types
of immigrant labor) (last visited Jan. 15, 2006); see also JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN
SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 51 (Harvard University Press 2005)
(pointing to the 9/11 attacks and the Hoffman decision as the twin major events affecting
immigrant worker rights).
156. See Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the
War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 59 (2004) (describing the United States' tendency
to view nonimmigrant workers as threatening and loyal to their home country); Thomas W.
Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of
Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 1 (2002) (explaining
the legality of using "Mexican appearance" as one factor "in the decision to stop moving
vehicles and to check the immigration status of their occupants").
157. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302,
110 Stat. 1214, 1248 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (1996)).
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suspicion of immigrants has led to a climate of fear that might result in
lower levels of immigrant participation in associations and unions post-
9/11. If immigrants fear being active in their workplace, labor's freedom
of association might be compromised. Some of the most direct effects on
immigrants' freedom of association are a result of the Supreme Court's
2002 Hoffnan decision.
In the 1935 legislative findings of the National Labor Relations Act,
Congress recognized that individual working people could only obtain
bargaining power in association with other workers. Congress sought to
"[e]ncourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and...
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association.', 5 8  Employee
status, broadly and circularly defined as "any employee" who is not
excluded by other parts of the Act,'59 applies to workers without regard to
immigration status. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court held in the 1984 Sure-
Tan v. NLRB decision that unfair labor practices could not be committed
against all workers, including those who were not authorized to work in the
United States. 60 The question that the Supreme Court left unresolved in
Sure-Tan, which occupied the NLRB and the lower courts for years
thereafter, dealt with the remedies an undocumented worker could claim
after a violation of the Act.'
6'
Six months after 9/11, the Supreme Court made it plain that the
standard remedy of backpay-wages that would have been earned but for
the unlawful termination-was not available for undocumented workers
who were fired in retaliation for union organizing. The Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) already prohibited reinstatement
of an unauthorized worker to his or her former employment for union
organizing. The Hoffman decision thus removed the remaining effective
deterrent against employers who deny the right to association.
62
The Hoffman case was argued and decided in the unsettled days after
9/11. The Court granted certiorari two weeks after September 11.163 In
158. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). The legislative findings of the Wagner Act of 1935 stated
that workers were powerless to remedy the conditions of their employment except through
collective action.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000).
160. 467 U.S. 883, 896 (1984).
161. Id. at 913.
162. The Hoffman majority opinion responded that the employer would not get off "scot-
free," since the employer was still required to post a notice that it had violated the NLRA
and could be subject to contempt proceedings for failing to do so. 535 U.S. at 152. In
dissent, Justice Breyer pointed out that the remaining remedies allowed the employer to
violate the labor laws, at least once, with impunity. 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Catherine L. Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 421 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds.,
2005).
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October 2001, the Supreme Court was the target of anthrax-laced letters."6
Ryan McCortney, the attorney for Hoffman, recounted in a recent interview
that when he called the Supreme Court's clerk to inquire about the status of
his case, the clerk was working out of a van outside of the courthouse
because of the anthrax scare.'65
During this unsettled period, McCortney also decided to broaden the
usual conception of an undocumented immigrant from the Mexican
sneaking across the border to find work, such as the worker in Hoffman, to
a student who works in violation of her visa. After all, many of the 9/11
hijackers had entered the country legitimately on student visas. 1
66
At the oral argument in January 2002, some of the justices seemed
more preoccupied with the "massive problem" of illegal immigration than
any concern for the effect that the decision might have on workers'
rights. 167  Paul Wolfson, the Deputy Solicitor General .representing the
NLRB, argued that eliminating backpay would erase the right of
association for a large number of people currently working in the United
States. In response, Justice Scalia retorted:
I would have thought, Mr. Wolfson, that when you said, you
know, there are 7 million illegal aliens in this country, that what
you would follow that with is not, that's an awful lot of people
not to give back pay [sic] to. I would have thought you would
follow it with, we have to do something to reduce this massive
number of 7 million illegal aliens.
168
The decision itself also reflected a growing urgency to protect the
nation's borders, even at the expense of labor law. In his opinion for the
five-member Court majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist put it starkly: "There
is no reason to think that Congress nonetheless intended to permit backpay
where but for an employer's unfair labor practices, an alien-employee
would have remained in the United States illegally, and continued to work
illegally, all the while successfully evading apprehension by immigration
authorities."'
169
The Hoffman decision dealt with immigrant workers more harshly




167. Justice Antonin Scalia, Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB (2002) (No. 00-1595), 2002 WL 77224.
168. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
(2002) (No. 00-1595), 2002 WL 77224. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an
Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor
Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737 (2003) (stating the IRCA position that illegal aliens
cannot get backpay).
169. Hoffnan, 535 U.S. at 149.
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including the IRCA. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Sure-
Tan v. NLRB, which held that an employer calling immigration control into
its factory in retaliation for union organizing was a violation of the
NLRA. 70 The majority did not have to deal with the backpay question
because the workers were out of the country and thus "unavailable" to
collect their backpay or mitigate their damages. Justice Rehnquist joined a
concurring and dissenting opinion authored by Justice Powell, which
agreed that the workers could not get backpay because they were
"unavailable" to collect it but disagreed that they were "employees" under
the NLRA, finding it "unlikely that Congress intended the term 'employee'
to include-for purposes of being accorded the benefits of that protective
statute-persons wanted by the United States for the violation of our
criminal laws."''
Besides the post-9/ll context, many factors contributed to the
decision in Hoffman, including a generally increasing concern about the
social and economic impact of immigration throughout the 1990s that
resulted in measures like California's Proposition 187 and a growing
militarization of the border. 72 In addition, the legal context for immigrant
workers changed in 1986. The IRCA, passed two years after the Sure-Tan
decision, made the hiring of undocumented workers illegal under federal
law for the first time. 7' However, the IRCA did not change the definition
of "employee" in the NLRA, which since its inception in 1935 has never
made any reference to a worker's immigration status.
Thus, the question of whether the undocumented were entitled to the
same remedies as all other "employees" came before the Court again in
Hoffman. The only two members of the Court remaining from the Sure-
Tan era were Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice Rehnquist's
position may have been forecast by his dissenting opinion in Sure-Tan, or
his general view that civil liberties must be tempered during wartime:
The courts, for their part, have largely reserved the decisions
favoring civil liberties in wartime to be handed down after the
war is over. . . . To lawyers and judges, this may seem a
170. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
171. Id. at 913 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
172. See Ruben J. Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant Status and Identity in Law and
LatCrit Theory, 55 FLA. L. REv. 511 (2003) (arguing that current anti-discrimination laws
ignore discrimination based on immigrant status); Ruben J. Garcia, Critical Race Theory
and Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv.
118 (1995) (explaining Proposition 187 as consistent with the racism prevalent in U.S.
immigration history); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular
Democracy and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal
Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REv. 629 (1995) (discussing the impact of Proposition
187 on "discrete and insular minorities").
173. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)-(b).
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thoroughly undesirable state of affairs, but in the great scheme of
things it may be best for all concerned.
7 4
Justice O'Connor's trajectory from Sure-Tan to Hoffman is harder to
explain.'75 On the one hand, the Hoffman opinion affirmed Justice
O'Connor's conclusion in Sure-Tan that the undocumented workers were
"employees," but there were none of the concerns in the Hoffman majority
opinion that Justice O'Connor expressed in Sure-Tan about the negative
effects resulting from denial of labor law protections to undocumented
workers. Justice O'Connor wrote in Sure-Tan:
If undocumented alien employees were excluded from
participation in union activities and from protections against
employer intimidation, there would be created a subclass of
workers without a comparable stake in the collective goals of
their legally resident co-workers, thereby eroding the unity of all
the employees and impeding effective collective bargaining.
17 6
Justice Kennedy, another member of the Hoffman majority, had
previously seen the need for labor law protection for immigrants while
deciding a case as a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, writing
that to do otherwise would "leave helpless the very persons who most need
protection from exploitative employer practices."'77 In Hoffman, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy simply joined the majority opinion, which did not
include any language about why it made sense to bring undocumented
workers within the meaning of the term "employee."
There might be many reasons why Justice O'Connor joined the
majority opinion in Hoffman. However, a prelude to Justice O'Connor's
position in Hoffman could be seen in a speech at New York University Law
School shortly after 9/11, where Justice O'Connor warned that Americans
might have to get used to limitations on their freedoms and legal change as
a result of the attacks.'78 In her speech, Justice O'Connor primarily
174. MACK & KELLY, supra note 69, at 234-35 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist's Sept.
18, 1998 lecture at Drake University School of Law, reprinted in 47 DRAKE L. REv. 201-08
(1998)).
175. Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, some
three weeks before the Court's decision in Hoffman, also provides a very different view of
administrative deference than the one taken by the Hoffman majority. In Ragsdale, Justice
O'Connor called for deference to the Department of Labor's remedy for violations of the
Family and Medical Leave Act. 535 U.S. 81, 102 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 892 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 33 (1937)).
177. NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F. 2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
178. See Linda Greenhouse, A Nation Challenged: The Supreme Court; In New York
Visit, O'Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5 ("We're
more likely to experience more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the
case in our country." (quoting Justice O'Connor)); see also DELGADO, supra note 39, at 67-
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questioned whether constitutional criminal protections should apply to
terrorists rather than the "rules of war," but she made clear that 9/11 "will
cause us to re-examine some of our laws pertaining to criminal
surveillance, wiretapping, immigration and so on."' 79 In addition, Justice
O'Connor's position may have evolved, in the words of the Hoffman
majority opinion, as a result of a "legal landscape now significantly
changed" by the IRCA.1
8 0
Ultimately, the Hoffman decision highlights the inadequacy of
domestic law in a global labor market. International labor and human
rights norms apply to all workers regardless of immigration status, and
international trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement also require respecting migrant workers' freedom of
association. 81  Thus, eight months after the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Hoffman, the AFL-CIO filed a complaint with the International
Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association,
asserting that the Hoffman decision violated ILO Convention 87, which
protects freedom of association for all workers "without distinction
whatsoever."' 82 In November 2003, the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association sent the complaint to the next level of review, the Commission
of Inquiry, and invited the United States to "explore all possible solutions,
including amending its legislation" to redress the denial of freedom of
association to migrants.183 The Committee concluded that the remedial
measures available to the NLRB regarding the dismissal of undocumented
workers were inadequate protection "against acts of anti-union
discrimination., 184 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights similarly
68 (interpreting Justice O'Connor's speech as a forewarning of more government restriction
on personal freedom).
179. Greenhouse, supra note 178, at B5 (quoting Justice O'Connor).
180. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
181. See International Labor Organization Conventions 87 and 98, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (reciting the
ILO agreements on the protection of workers' freedom of association and the right to
organize); North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, supra note 31 (recognizing
the protection of freedom of association and the right to organize as a guiding principle of
the NALC).
182. See A. Pankert, Freedom of Association, in COMPARATWVE LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 146 (R. Blanpain & F. Millard eds., 1982) (exploring the conflict
between trade unions and governments over the freedom of association); Jane Hodges-
Aeberhard, The Right to Organize in Article 2 of Convention 87: What Is Meant by Workers
"Without Distinction Whatsoever"?, 128 INT'L LAB. REv. 177, 193 (1989) (discussing the
implications of the "without distinctions whatsoever" provision of ILO Convention 87).
183. Press Release, International Labour Organization, ILO Governing Body Establishes
Commission of Inquiry to Examine Violations of Trade Union Rights in Belarus (Nov. 20,
2003), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2003/48.htm.
184. Complaints Against the Government of the United States Presented by the
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) and
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found that the decision violated regional human rights principles.1
5
The legal maneuvering over the labor rights of immigrants takes place
in the context of growing restriction on the political rights of immigrants.
8 6
The USA PATRIOT Act provided the Attorney General with broad powers
to indefinitely detain immigrants on certain "watch lists." Noncitizens on
these lists are stripped of the regular administrative immigration procedures
to which other immigrants are normally entitled. Five months after
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which removes immigrants
defined as "terrorists" from immigration administrative processes, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in its Hoffman opinion, eliminated backpay for
undocumented workers seeking to redress labor violations. Thus, the first
effects of the War on Terror in the workplace have been borne directly by
immigrant workers, but the impact will eventually be felt by all workers.
The reduced likelihood that undocumented workers will organize will mean
a reduction in the bargaining power of all workers.
Immigrants have become more important to the leaders of the labor
movement as unionization has declined with the erosion of the
manufacturing sector. In 2000, the AFL-CIO shifted positions and
supported amnesty for undocumented workers in the United States.
Immigrants are particularly important to the labor movement in California,
where a recent survey showed that 54% of foreign-born noncitizens would
vote for union representation, whereas only 42% of native-born U.S.
citizens showed interest in union representation. 187  Thus, immigrants
promise to be labor's greatest hope to stem its decline in membership. If
immigrants are deterred from unionizing because of the lack of legal
protections, the ability of all workers to associate will suffer.
The inverse dialectic between domestic insecurity and workers' rights
is similar to the relationship between domestic insecurity and attacks on
minorities and immigrants. The fact that many workers affected by the
War on Terror are people of color, immigrants, or both, compounds this
the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), Rep. No. 332, Case No. 2227, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/index.htm (Follow "specific country" hyperlink, then "United
States" hyperlink, then "Freedom of Association" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
185. Sarah Cleveland et al., Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae
Brief: The United States Violates International Law When Labor Law Remedies Are
Restricted Based on Workers' Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 795 (2003).
186. See Beth Lyon, When More "Security" Equals Less Workplace Safety:.
Reconsidering US. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 571, 606 (2004) (arguing that discrimination against immigrant workers threatens to
undermine the rights of all workers); Peter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals: Immigration,
Terror, and Democracy After September 11, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 481, 486 (2002) (arguing
that national security can be compatible with democracy).
187. Margaret Weir, Income Polarization and California 's Social Contract, THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA LABOR 97, 121 (2002), available at http://www.iir.ucla.eduscl/pdf02/
scl2002ch5.pdf.
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dialectic. 188 Besides the loss of freedom of association, workers of color
have been subject to English-only policies in the name of national security
and the possibility that the privacy of their employment records would be
overridden by the USA PATRIOT Act.
189
B. The Effect of the War on Terror on Administrative Adjudication at the
NLRB
The environment created by the War on Terror has affected nonunion
workers as well as unionized workers. This is because the War on Terror
has become a justification in recent decisions of the NLRB, weakening the
right of association for nonunion workers as well as unionized workers.
The NLRB is the federal agency charged with enforcing federal labor law,
both as a prosecutor of unfair labor practice charges and as an adjudicator
of labor rights through administrative law judges under the supervision of
the five-member Board in Washington, D.C. The NLRA gives the
President the power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint
members to the Board for five-year terms.' 90 In practice, Democrats and
Republicans have divided the appointments, though appointments from the
President's party always form a 3-2 majority. 91  For this reason, in
Republican as well as Democratic administrations, the Board has been
criticized as being merely a mouthpiece for the President's labor policy.
192
188. "War on Terror" is a contested phrase. Noam Chomsky has argued that the "War
on Terror" is a logical impossibility because there is no single definition of "terror"; rather,
"terror" is contingent, contextual, and perspectival. CHOMSKY, supra note 11.
189. See EEOC Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, COMPLIANCE MANUAL Section 13,
Dec. 2, 2002 (clarifying that because of the USA PATRIOT Act, employers do not violate
Title VII by cooperating with law enforcement officers seeking access to employee
personnel files); Mary Lou Pickel, Refugees Want Airport Jobs Back; English-only Test
Unfair, Somalis Say, ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb. 12, 2004, at El ("A move to tighten airport
security by requiring that workers read enough English to pass a written test has cost a
group of Somali refugees their jobs at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport."); see also
FREDERICK S. LANE III, THE NAKED EMPLOYEE: How TECHNOLOGY Is COMPROMISING
WORKPLACE PRIVACY 19-22 (2003) (explaining the disappearance of employee privacy as
an inevitable consequence of corporate electronic surveillance); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED
CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANxiOus AGE 135 (2004) (arguing that
electronic spying by the government is an intrusion of privacy); Jessica LaBumbard,
Homeland Security Targets Immigrants Working With Hazardous Chemicals, LAB. NOTES,
Dec. 2003 (noting the targeting by immigration authorities of hazardous chemical
industries).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2000).
191. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS AND THE NLRB-
A MEMOIR 54 (2000) (describing President Clinton's appointees to the NLRB).
192. See id. at 255-86 (2000) (describing how Clinton-appointed Board Chairman Gould
became the "Number One Enemy" of the House Republicans); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV,
AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 22-23
(1996) (describing how unions vehemently criticized the Reagan appointed Board while
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Since George W. Bush has been President, his appointees have used the
threat of terrorism as a reason for decisions that have limited labor's
freedom of association.
C. The Decision in International Protective Services: Limits on the Right
to Strike
Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees who "engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection."'1 93 This broad protection of freedom of association has
been held to prevent discipline of unionized and nonunion employees who
cease work to redress workplace issues, such as a walk-out to protest safety
conditions. 194 The Board long has held that section 7 also protects the right
to strike without giving notice to the employer, unless the notice is required
by some other provision of the NLRA, by contract, or is otherwise required
to protect the employer's interests.19 The ILO's Committee on Freedom of
Association has found the right to strike to be an "essential means available
to workers and their organisations [sic] for the promotion and protection of
their social and economic interests.'
' 96
Although section 13 of the NLRA states that "[n]othing in this
subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so
as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right,' 97 the
Board and the courts have found a number of limitations on the right to
engage an immediate strike.' 98 For example, the Board has held that strikes
were illegal when they endangered the employer's property, or exposed the
employers complained that the Kennedy and Johnson Boards tended to favor unions).
193. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
194. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 841 (1984) (holding that an
employee was engaged in protected concerted action when he refused to drive a truck he
believed was unsafe); NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (holding that
the employees who walked out due to unsatisfactory work conditions were engaged in
protected concerted activity).
195. See Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 14 (agreeing with the Board's decision that
employees were not required to present demands to the employer in order to qualify for
concerted activity protection).
196. SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND
POLITICAL THEORY 194 (1992) (quoting ILO Digest of Decisions (3d ed. 1985) 360-63).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2000).
198. See James Gray Pope, How Americans Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales,
103 MICH. L. RFv. 518, 550-51 (2004) (explaining the reversal of important labor rights
within the context of constitutional doctrine); James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of
Freedom, 106 YALE L.J 941, 942 (1997) (discussing labor's struggle for freedom within the
context of constitutional history); Katherine V. W. Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in
American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (arguing that the Supreme Court tends to
favor management in labor-management disputes).
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plant, equipment or products to "foreseeable imminent danger due to
sudden cessation of work."' 199
The question of what constitutes "imminent danger" to an employer's
property requiring notice of a strike came before the Board in 2003 in Int'l
Protective Services, Inc.,00 relating to the fears of domestic terrorism
against federal buildings after the 1995 Oklahoma City federal building
bombing. In the late 1990s, the U.S. government contracted with a private
company, International Protective Services (IPS), to provide security at the
federal building in Anchorage, Alaska.2' The security workers were
represented by the United Government Security Officers of America, Local
46 and sought to obtain a first collective bargaining agreement with IPS.
202
On March 10, 1999, with negotiations between IPS and the union stalled,
the union informed the government's General Services Administration
(GSA) of its intent to strike "within the next few weeks" and that the strike
would occur at "the most opportune time for the Union."203 The timing of a
strike at the most inopportune time for the employer is a major source of
the economic leverage the union gains in striking. As is typical of the
process in most unions, the membership of Local 46 voted to give Union
President Charles Reed the authority to call the strike at the "appropriate
time.' '20 4 Reed sought to call the strike on March 23 but was stymied by
many workers who did not want to strike because of security concerns
stemming from the anniversary of the Oklahoma City federal building
bombing approaching, which was approaching on April 19.205
Finally, on April 21, the union commenced the strike at noon. The
employer had already made preparations to replace the nineteen striking
workers, and by April 23, the employer sent a letter to the workers
notifying them that they "self-terminated" their employment by abandoning
their post.2°6 The Administrative Law Judge found that the union's April
21 strike was "designed" to compromise security.20 7
On July 15, 2003, a three-member panel of the Board upheld the
ALJ's decision finding that the strike was not protected by the NLRA.
Although there was no specific threat on the Anchorage federal building,
199. Int'l Protective Services, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. No. 75 1, 4 (2003) (quoting Bethany
Medical Center, 328 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1094 (1999)).




203. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Id.
206. Id. app. (appended decision by Administrative Law Judge Gerald A. Wacknov).
207. Int'l Protective Services, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (2003), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/sharedfiles/decisions/339/339-75.htm.
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the Board stated that, because of the Oklahoma City federal building
bombing anniversary and several other "ominous anniversaries of infamous
individuals," the union's strike "recklessly intended to place the Federal
buildings and their occupants at risk. 2 8 The employer thus did not violate
the NLRA by terminating the workers for their strike.
The IPS decision can be viewed as merely an extension of the law that
is unfriendly to the right to strike. James Gray Pope and other scholars
have pointed to numerous examples of judicial gloss placed on otherwise
clear statutory language protecting the right to strike and associate, which
have led to a weakening of labor's freedom of association.0 9 The IPS
decision can also be seen as legitimate borrowing of norms limiting strikes
in the public sector when the federal government contracts with private
employers. It is important to note that this borrowing is not compelled by
statute but simply a decision by the Board about whether a strike is so
disloyal that employees should lose NLRA section 7 protection. While the
law finding "disloyal or indefensible" strikes unprotected has not changed,
it appears more likely after 9/11 that judges will find strikes touching upon
national security or vague threats of terrorism to be unprotected.
D. The Board's Decision in IBM Corp.: Terrorism as Justification
Until June 2004, section 7 of the NLRA also protected the right of
nonunion workers to request that a co-employee accompany them to a
disciplinary interview on the theory that such activity was part of "mutual
aid or protection" for all employees, regardless of union representation. In
IBM Corp.,210 the NLRB reversed course and held that section 7 did not
protect nonunion employees from retaliation if they requested
representation at an interview likely to lead to discipline, a right guaranteed
to unionized employees by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1975 decision in
NLRB v. J. Weingarten Inc.211 The NLRB first extended the Weingarten
decision to nonunion workers in its Materials Research decision in 1982.212
Three years later, in Sears Roebuck, the Board changed course again and
held that the Weingarten decision was meant to apply only to union
208. Id. at 5.
209. See JAMiES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 19
(1983) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions are unduly biased against the right to strike);
Karl Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 540, 550-53
(3d ed. 1998) (arguing that over-use of arbitration tends to divest workers of important
rights); Pope, supra note 198 (discussing the pattern of Supreme Court reversals of
important labor rights).
210. 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (2004).
211. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
212. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).
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workers. 23  The difference between the two decisions appeared to be
explainable by the fact that, by 1985, a majority of the Board had been
appointed by Republican President Ronald Reagan. In 2000, when a
majority of the Board had been appointed by Democratic President Bill
Clinton, the Board went back to the Materials Research rule and held in
Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio that the NLRA protected the right
of nonunion employees to request representation at disciplinary
interviews.2 4 The Board reasoned that the Weingarten decision was
grounded in the text of NLRA section 7 and that "section 7 rights are
enjoyed by all employees and are [not] dependent on union representation
for their implementation. 2 5
By January 2004, three new Republican appointees had joined
Democratic appointees Dennis Walsh and Wilma Liebman on the five-
member Board.1 6 In June 2004, the Board reversed Epilepsy Foundation
by a three-to-two vote, holding that nonunion employees did not have the
right to request representation at the beginning of an investigation likely to
lead to discipline.217 Although the decisions of the Board are often
criticized as being blatantly politicized, in IBM Corp., the Board's
Republican majority utilized the new War on Terror as a justification for
limiting the Weingarten rule to unionized employees. Pointing to "a rise in
the need for investigatory interviews, both in response to new statutes
governing the workplace and as a response to new security concerns raised
by terrorist attacks on our country, 218 the Board majority concluded that
employers must be allowed "to investigate an employee without the
presence of a coworker., 219 The Board's connection to a "changed world"
was explicitly focused on 9/11:
In recent years, there have been many changes in the workplace
environment, including ever-increasing requirements to conduct
workplace investigations, as well as new security concerns raised
by incidents of national and workplace violence...220
213. 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
214. Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 678 (2000) (quoting Glomac
Plastics, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311 (1978)).
215. Id. at 678.
216. In January 2004, President Bush appointed Ronald Meisburg to replace R.
Alexander Acosta, who left the Board in August 2003 to be Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights. National Labor Relations Board Members, http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/
structure/fbmembers.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
217. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (2004), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/
sharedfiles/decisions/341/341-148.pdf.
218. Id. at 6.
219. Id. at 4.
220. Id. at 3.
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Further, because of the [September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks], we
must now take into account the presence of both real and
threatened terrorist attacks.22'
In dissent, the two Democratic members of the Board chastised the
majority for opening the American workplace as a new front in the War on
Terror.2 2 The dissent stated, "We are told ... that everything has changed
in 'today's troubled world,' following 'terrorist attacks on our country,' the
rise of workplace violence, and an increase in 'corporate abuse and
fiduciary lapses.', 223 In any event, the dissenters complained, much of
today's crime is limited to the executive suites. 224 The majority retorted
that the Board was not encouraging private employers to wage war on
employee rights, but rather was simply refusing to forbid employers from
"hold[ing] such private inquiries" of their employees.225
The colloquy between the majority and the dissent in IBM reflects the
highly partisan nature of NLRB decisionmaking. The Republican-
dominated NLRB would have likely overruled Epilepsy Foundation,
regardless of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, the explicit references to
the War on Terror indicate that the 9/11 attacks provided legitimization for
the decision because of a "changed world" and a changed workplace. In a
public speech at New York University after the decision, NLRB Chairman
Robert J. Battista again invoked "the global war on terrorism" as one of the
challenges facing the nation, which suggests that the IBM decision will not
be the last to use the War on Terror as a justification.2 26 The political
context serves as a catalyst for the devolution of rights.
E. Firstline Transportation Security: The Creeping of the Public into the
Private
Indeed, a case currently pending before the Board may introduce a
"national security" exception to collective bargaining. The case involves
airport screeners at Kansas City International Airport who sought to be
represented by a private sector union. The Kansas City airport is one of
four airports participating in a pilot program allowing private contractors to
provide airport security services.227 In this pilot program, the TSA places
221. Id. at 4.
222. Id. at 18 (Liebman, J. & Walsh, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1I.
226. NLRB Chairman Battista's Speech at New York University's Labor Conference,
DAILY LAB. REP., May 23, 2005, at C1.
227. Firstline Transp. Sec., NLRB 17th Reg., Case No. 17-RC-12354 (May 27, 2005),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared-files/decisions/dde/2005/17-RC-12354(5-27-
05).pdf.
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the same restrictions on the employees of private contractors as it does on
its own employees. Among other restrictions, the workers must be U.S.
citizens, they must not present a national security risk, and they are not
allowed to strike. In his capacity as administrator of secret-ballot elections
deciding union representation, the Regional Director in Kansas City
entertained a petition filed by the Security, Police and Fire Professionals of
America (SPFPA) to represent the security screeners. The case highlights a
trend raised by the International Protective Services case discussed above,
where the federal government contracts out security functions. The
Firstline Company made two arguments to the Regional Director of the
NLRB Kansas City region: (1) that the screeners were not covered by the
NLRA because of the Airline Transportation Safety Act (ATSA); and,
alternatively, (2) an undefined national security exception to the right of
private sector employees exempted the screeners from collective
bargaining.228
On May 27, 2005, NLRB Regional Director D. McConnell in
Overland Park, Kansas, decided that both of Firstline's arguments lacked
merit and subsequently ordered an election. McConnell rejected the
argument that the ATSA preempted or modified the NLRA, finding that
neither Congress nor the agency had taken a position on the collective
bargaining rights of private security screener employees, other than their
belief that neither group had the right to strike.229 The Regional Director
decided that the ATSA did not prevent the screeners from exercising the
labor rights of private employees. As for the national security exception,
the Regional Director failed to find it in the text of the statute. "In some
circumstances," McConnell wrote, "policy considerations do militate in
favor of or against the assertion of the Board's discretionary jurisdiction.
The goal in the instant case is to balance the Board's interest in effectuating
the purposes and policies of the Act, with the Federal Government's
,,210 elcnlddtainterest in protecting national security. McConnell concluded that
national security and collective bargaining for the contractor screeners were
compatible because the screeners had no right to strike and the private
employees would be subject to the same training and requirements as
federal employees.231
Parties aggrieved by a Regional Director's administration of an
election can request review, as Firstline did, by the five-member Board in
Washington, D.C., for "compelling reasons. 232  On June 30, 2005, the
Board granted Firstline's petition for review and invited amicus briefs on
228. Id. at 2.
229. Id. at 7.
230. Id. at 10.
231. Id. at 10-11.
232. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c)(4) (2005).
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the case.233
In a dissent from the decision to grant review, Board member Wilma
Liebman opened her opinion by quoting Professor Joseph Slater's work on
the DHS and the TSA: "For decades, the statutory pronouncements of
Congress and most state legislatures have favored collective bargaining in
private and public employment. Now this principle is under attack.,
234
Liebman argued that the Board should not have accepted the employer's
invitation to "create an unprecedented 'national security' exception to its
jurisdiction, assuming it has the power to do so. '235 Liebman pointed to
many instances where the Board rejected attempts to deny the protections
of the NLRA to employees working in security-sensitive employment, such
as employees in nuclear power plants and militarized plant guards.236
Besides explaining why peaceful resolution of disputes actually enhanced
security, Liebman also pointed out that if the Board agreed with the
employer's position, it "arguably would violate the international
obligations of the United States to protect workplace freedom of
association. 237
While Clinton appointee Liebman would have denied review because
of the potential for another decision like IBM, Bush appointees Battista and
Schaumber cautioned that Liebman assumed the majority had prejudged
the case by granting review, when in fact, "[n]othing could be further from
the truth., 231 Indeed, the Board has not yet decided the issue of whether
security screeners employed by private companies should engage in
collective bargaining. Nevertheless, its prior decisions, and the general
climate of suspicion of freedom of association in the post-9/1 1 period,
suggests an uphill battle for the airport screeners' union. It is also likely
that the decision will take place without serious examination of the
empirical evidence that shows unionized workers actually aid security.
Member Liebman pointed out in her IBM dissent that the Board majority
had no empirical support for its conclusion that too many rights leads to
less security: "With little interest in empirical evidence, the majority
confidently says that recognizing [a right for nonunion employees to have a
233. Susan J. McGolick, NLRB Invites Amicus Briefs on Whether Private Airport
Screeners Covered by NLRA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), July 8, 2005, at A-1.
234. Firstline Transp. Sec., 344 N.L.R.B. 124, at 1 (2005) (Member Liebman, dissenting)
(quoting Slater, supra note 115, at 297).
235. Id. at 1-2.
236. Id. (citing Gen. Elec. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 726, 736 (1950); NLRB v. E.C. Atkins &
Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1947); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947)).
237. Id. at 2. Liebman also noted that the American Federation of Government
Employees (AFGE) had brought a complaint regarding the exclusion of the federal workers
in the ILO. Id. at n.1 1 (citing Int'l Labor Org. Case No. 2292, presented by the American
Federation of Government Employees).
238. Id. at 1, n.1.
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coworker present during a disciplinary interview] would make it impossible
for nonunion employers to conduct effective workplace investigations and
so would endanger the workplace., 239 There is already evidence that the
employee turnover rates of TSA screeners are continually approaching the
high turnover rates of screeners before the jobs were federalized.24 °
Further, since both private contractor screeners and federal employees
would be unable to strike, there would be no threat to national security
except through an unlikely repeat of the illegal PATCO strike.241
As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Hoffman,
the Supreme Court majority was not interested in the empirical reality that
denying backpay would not lead to tighter borders.242 Justice Breyer
observed that the availability of jobs, not backpay, is the magnet bringing
the undocumented to the United States: "To permit the Board to award
backpay could not significantly increase the strength of this magnetic force,
for so speculative a future possibility could not realistically influence an
individual's decision to migrate illegally." 43  Given the post-Hoffman
resort to international forums, and given the current political climate, it
seems unlikely that Congress will clarify that immigrant workers have
remedies under the NLRA.
239. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, at 18 (2004).
240. Stephen Barr, TSA Scrambling to Keep Up with Turnover Among Screeners, WASH.
POST, Feb. 18, 2004, at B2; Sara Kehaulani Goo, High Turnover at Agency Raises Concern
for Air Safety, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A09. A report by the American Federation of
Government Employees cited reports in the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and
Washington Post documenting a turnover rate that went from 20% to 30% from August
2004 to April 2005. American Federation of Government Employees, Empower Screeners
to Ensure Security (May 2005), available at http://www.afge.org/Documents/
TSA%20White%20Paper.doc.
241. Even during the PATCO strike, replacement workers kept the system running,
which certainly limited the effectiveness of the strike. See Northrup, supra note 140, at 252
(explaining how replacement workers were crucial to the system's functioning).
242. Nearly ten years after Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, immigration to the United States continues unabated. This is an example of how laws
affecting immigrants actually have little impact on whether migrants make the journey to
the United States.
243. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers
Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 410-15 (1995) (showing no significant influence from so
speculative a factor); Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F. 2d 700, 704 (1 1th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that aliens enter the country in the hope of getting a job, not to gain the
protection of our labor laws)).
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V. REINVIGORATING LABOR'S FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION POST-9/11
A. Why Freedom of Association Is Good for Security
There is little doubt that the threat of new terrorism inside the United
States is real and dangerous.244 Criminals or terrorists should not be
allowed to hide behind the right of association. Indeed, when union
officials corrupted by mob influence have asserted that their prosecution
violated freedom of association, these arguments have been rejected . 45
One might argue that allowing undocumented immigrants in unions is a
threat to national security. This argument, however, treats unions
differently than other associations, and undocumented immigrants are
protected by the constitutional right of association just as any other person
within U.S. jurisdiction.246
Encouraging associations is good for the security of unions and for the
security of their members' employment. In addition, there is reason to
think that enhancing freedom of association would be good for our
collective security. Freedom of association in the workplace is critical to
the functioning of a democratic society. It is not a historical accident that
oppressive regimes tend to restrict the right of association in the workplace.
Myanmar and Indonesia are two examples of countries known for human
rights abuses that also restrict or ban the right to organize. 247 Whether or
244. The recent terrorist attacks in London suggest that 9/11 will not be the last attempt
to attack targets within the United States. See Peter Bergen, Our Ally, Our Problem, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2005, at A23 (noting how the United States' Visa Waiver Program makes it
easy for Britain's angry young Muslims to board a plane for the United States); Paul Vitello,
In Americans, Lurking Fears Rise to Surface, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at AI (noting that
Americans were experiencing "raw emotion" after the attack on London, "a capital so
closely related to America culturally").
245. See Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54 v. Read, 597 F.
Supp. 1431, 1446-51 (D.N.J. 1984) (rejecting the claim that New Jersey Casino Control
Commission's order requiring removal of union officials based upon their organized crime
associations violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association), affd mem. 772
F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1985).
246. See Am.-Amb Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir.
1995), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) ("[T]he foreign policy powers which
permit the political branches great discretion to determine which aliens to exclude from
entering this country do not authorize those political branches to subject aliens who reside
here to a fundamentally different First Amendment associational right.")
247. See, e.g., Marc Lifsher, Unocal Settles Human Rights Lawsuit Over Alleged Abuses
at Myanmar Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at C6 (describing the atrocities Myanmar
employees were subjected to, including forced labor "in intense tropical heat with little food
or rest"); Sara Davis & Mickey Spiegel, Take Tough Action to End China's Mining
Tragedies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/23/
chinal0203.htm (explaining that Chinese mineworkers are forbidden to organize under
Chinese law); US./Indonesia: Bush Backtracks on Corporate Responsibility, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 7, 2002, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/
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not increased unionization is the cause or effect of political liberalization,
liberties are under strain without an independent trade union movement.
Workplace association inevitably leads to greater political activity, as the
higher level of political participation by union members attests.
248
The lack of associations will lead to a weaker bulwark against
terrorism. The "United We Stand" slogan used in the days after 9/11 could
just as easily be applied to the unity and solidarity that comes from
associations, particularly unions. To the extent that unions and other
associations bring people of disparate backgrounds together to pursue
common goals, they may be necessary now more than ever.24 ' As we spend
most of our time at work, the workplace is the last remaining locus of unity
that most of us have. To deny and stifle the autonomy of workplace
associations means that fewer people will have an investment in American
democracy.
Besides the democratic benefits that associations provide, unions have
played important roles in improving security since 9/11. For example, at a
time when port security is a major concern, the International Longshore
and Warehouse Union (ILWU) has been vocal about the need to hire more
workers. 250 Having more workers at ports would allow shipping companies
to inspect a greater number of containers that arrive in ports. In New York,
unionized doormen at apartment buildings have received training in how to
recognize suspicious packages and deal with terrorist incidents.25" '
Sometimes, unions engage in interest group activity for their own reasons,
which also may be consistent with concerns about safety. Recently,
exxon080702.htm (describing the U.S. State Department's attempt to get a lawsuit against
Exxon Mobil dismissed by a federal judge).
248. TAYLOR E. DARK, THE UNIONS AND THE DEMOCRATS: AN ENDURING ALLIANCE 50-
51 (rev. ed. 2004).
249. See CYNTHIA ESTLuND, WORKING TOGETHER: How THE WORKPLACE ASSOCIATIONS
STRENGTHEN BONDS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 104 (2003) ("The process of working together
leads to a sharing of experiences and beliefs ... among citizens whose daily lives may not
otherwise intersect."); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM & LEWIS M. FELDSTEIN, BETTER
TOGETHER: RESTORING THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 282 (2003) (supporting the idea that
associations can aid the fight against terror by "bridging social difference[s]"); ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 80-92
(2000) (describing a decline of American participation in civic organizations, especially
unions, since the 1950s).
250. John M. Broder, At Nation's Ports, Cargo Backlog Raises Question of Security,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at A12.
251. See Sara B. Miller, In War on Terror, An Expanding Citizens' Brigade, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 13, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0813/
p01 s02-ussc.html (describing how SEIU Local 32BJ conducted training for its members on
how to recognize and respond to terrorist activities); Lore Croghan, Training Against
Terrorism, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2004 (describing how the Local 32BJ program called
Project New York Safe and Secure was created during contract negotiations in 2003),
available at http://www.nydailynews.com/business/v-pfriendly/story/200461p-173054c.html.
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Association of Flight Attendants president Patricia Friend testified against
the use of cell phones in flight on airplanes in part because of the burden
that it places on flight attendants but also because cell phones may be used
to detonate bombs.252  The July 7, 2005 bombings in the London
Underground led transit unions in England and the United States to
question whether or not enough was being done to safeguard urban rail
systems. The Rail, Maritime and Transport Union is threatening to strike
unless there is an increase in the number of workers in the London
subway.253 In New York City, the Transport Workers Union (TWU) hired
a security firm to assist its members in dealing with terrorism because the
union felt that the city had failed to provide that type of training. 4 Roger
Toussaint, the president of TWU, wrote in a New York Times opinion piece
about the City's inadequate response to terrorist threats: "[T]he
transportation authority's emergency-training program is limited to a
brochure distributed to its employees and a public 'eyes and ears'
campaign-a tepid response that would be laughable if the situation was
,,255not so serious.
Demands by unions to increase the number of workers on the job may
cause some to believe that what the union is really doing is
"featherbedding." In extreme cases, the practice of a union negotiating so
that an employer hires more workers than necessary can be a violation of
federal labor law. Section 8(b)(6) of the Taft-Hartley Act makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of
value.., for services which are not performed or not to be performed.
'" 256
Job preservation clauses or hiring goal provisions, however, have been held
not to violate this section.257 For transit unions and other transportation
workers, then, security may be inextricably linked to worker safety, and
thus the unions would have strong incentives to bargain vigorously over
security issues and staffing levels.
Unions may enhance security in other ways as well. Unionized
workforces, because of their higher wages, lower turnover and better
training, are more suited to deal with security issues. While more
expensive in wages and benefits, economists Freeman and Medoff have
shown the long-term economic advantages of unions for employers, such as
252. Cell Phones on Planes: Nuisance or Necessity?, Associated Press, July 14, 2005,
available at WESTLAW, Westlaw Directory, APNEWS database.
253. Salamander Davoudi, Police Step-Up Random Search of Tube Passengers, FIN.
TIMES, July 22, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 11515435.
254. Sewall Chan, Transit Union Hires Security Trainer, Saying MTA. Is Not Doing
Enough, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at B6.
255. Roger Toussaint, Underground Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, at 11.
256. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) (2000).
257. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 100, at 283-85.
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lower turnover and resulting lower training costs. 258 Unionized workforces
generally have better protection from unjust dismissal than nonunion
workers, so they are better protected as whistleblowers.2 19  Given the
difficulties sometimes attendant in utilizing statutory whistleblower
protections, such as the availability of remedies or the requirement in
constitutional law that the matter must be of "public concern," protections
like arbitration and civil service are more likely to lead to employees
voicing security concerns at work.26°
The historical origins of the need for protection of labor's freedom of
association should not be forgotten. Indeed, unions were given legal
legitimacy in the 1930s precisely because they were seen to stave off
industrial sabotage and instability.261 The massive labor unrest that led to
the passage of the Act was disorderly and often posed a threat to public
safety. There were often violent confrontations between striking workers
and strikebreakers hired by companies to break the strikes. 262 In addition,
government and law enforcement officials often cooperated with
companies against striking workers.
For example, the San Francisco General Strike of 1934 started as a
strike of longshore workers and ended up shutting down the City of San
Francisco for several days.263 In the Colorado Coal Strike of 1913 to 1914,
the Colorado Governor brought in the National Guard, which led to a
258. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 103, 106 (1984)
(pointing to evidence from a national longitudinal survey in which unionized employees
were shown to have quitting rates twenty points lower than nonunion employees).
259. See Jesselyn Radack, The Government Attorney Whistleblower and the Rule of
Confidentiality: Compatible at Last, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (2003) (describing the
case of Coleen Rowley, an FBI attorney who blew the whistle on intelligence failures).
260. See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1007,
1038 (2005) ("Government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the
agencies for which they work; public debate may gain much from their informed opinions.")
(quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994)); Kevin Rivoli, Blowing the Whistle
Can Lead to Harsh Aftermath, Despite Law, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-07-31-whistle-usat x.htm (recounting the
difficulties of protecting whistleblowers in spite of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
261. The 1960 U.S. Supreme Court cases comprising the "Steelworkers Trilogy"
established union-run grievance arbitration as the preferred means for peaceful resolution of
labor disputes. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Steelworkers Trilogy: The Evolution of
Labor Arbitration, in LABOR LAW STORIES 149 (Laura M. Cooper & Catherine M. Stone
eds., 2005) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
262. Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know "What a Labor Union Is ": How State
Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public Sector Labor Law, 79 OR. L.
REv. 981, 1029 (2000) (describing Congress' prohibition on police strikes in the District of
Columbia after Boston's police strike of 1919 and how many cities soon followed suit).
263. JEREMY BRECHER, STRIKE! 159 (1997).
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massacre. 264 The violent history of the labor movement led to a lasting
impression that organized labor results in violence and that labor rights are
a threat to national security. However, it is important to note that strikes
escalated to a violent level often because of employer unwillingness to
negotiate and collusion with government and law enforcement officials.
Although the years after the passage of the NLRA were marked by more
mass demonstrations to solidify labor's right to organize, orderly collective
bargaining and the right to bargain has led to fewer large, violent disruptive
strikes since 1935.265
Fears about the conflicts between law enforcement bargaining and
public order can be readily addressed. Law enforcement employees, of
course, have always had their right to strike limited.266  The ILO has
recognized certain exceptions to collective bargaining for employees in
sensitive positions. Of course, there is always the possibility that
wrongdoers will infiltrate law enforcement organizations and attempt
sabotage, but that possibility will exist regardless of unionization. Finally,
after the PATCO debacle, it is unlikely that federal employees will engage
in another illegal strike risking security.
The material benefits to the lower tiers of the socioeconomic scale
provided by unions cannot be overlooked as a way to increase security.267
With the decline of unionization, we have seen a growing gulf between the
rich and poor in American society.268 Scholars have pointed to the growing
global gulf between rich and poor countries as one of the leading causes of
terrorism. 269 If American society continues to be economically stratified, it
might become fertile breeding ground for domestic terrorism, as has been
264. See HOWARD ZINN ET AL., THREE STRIKES: MINERS, MUSICIANS, SALESGIRLS AND
THE FIGHTING SPIRIT OF LABOR'S LAST CENTURY 5 (2002) (describing an instance of strike-
related violence).
265. See BEVERLY J. SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS' MOVEMENTS AND
GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870 (2004) (describing how local labor movements have been
related to world-scale political, economic and social processes).
266. Slater, supra note 262.
267. See Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic
Governance, in ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 7, 80 (1998) ("[A]n environment featuring
a low social wage, low union density and highly decentralized union organization is dense
with incentives for collectively irrational conflict.").
268. See BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA
(2002) (showing the difficulty of living on minimum wage in America by working in
various low-paying jobs); DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 6
(2004) (reporting a median net worth of $833,600 among the top 10% and just $7900 for the
bottom 20% of the economy).
269. See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (arguing that
policies imposed on developing countries through international trade agreements need to be
radically rethought); CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE (2001) (discussing the uninentended consequences of American
policies).
2006] LABOR'S FRAGILE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION POST-9/1 1 339
seen on a global scale. Workplace associations can help blunt this trend.
Rather than being inconsistent with national security, workplace
associations can be a vital component to the nation's security.
The United States also stands to gain security from promoting
freedom of association on a global scale. Workers exercising freedom of
association have demonstrably higher salaries than those who bargain
individually.27 ° The Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy (ACLD), a
division of the State Department, has reported that better-paying work can
deter terrorism. The ACLD's Report to the President and the State
Department, released May 10, 2002, found that the lack of protection for
trade unions in the Middle East was a contributing factor to the poverty in
the region, and then to social unrest. 271 The report found that many of the
Pakistanis that had joined the Taliban in the fight against the U.S. were
low-wage workers or seasonal farmers.272 It should be noted that some
ACLD members were skeptical of the effect that trade unions could have to
deter terrorism. Former U.S. Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall, for one,
said that developing countries might be "hostile to trade unions" regardless
of their democratic benefits. 273 There are certainly limits to the effect that
an independent trade union movement can have on terrorism, but the
considered judgment of international bodies such as the World Bank, as
well as the current foreign policy of the United States, is that economic
prosperity in terrorist-breeding countries should reduce terrorism. The
ACLD Report adds that economic development includes the increased
prosperity brought by the full protection of freedom of association.274
Further, there is no historical or empirical support for many of the
concerns about the negative effects of freedom of association on security.
Indeed, strikes are meant to destabilize in order to increase the leverage that
270. See David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, Changes Over Time in Union Relative
Wage Effects in the UK and US Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS
197, 215 (John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds., 2003) (placing union wages in the U.S.
from 1973 to 2001 as 18% higher than nonunion wages in all sectors); John Delaney,
Contemporary Developments in and Challenges to Collective Bargaining in the United
States, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 502, 508 (John T. Addison & Claus
Schnabel eds., 2003) (noting that the average earnings premium for unionized workers over
nonunionized workers from 1990 to 2001 was 30.4%).
271. See Release, U.S. Dept. of State, Labor Diplomacy: In the Service of Democracy
and Security (Dec. 31, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/l0043.htm
(discussing how unionization within politically unstable and socioeconomically
underdeveloped nations would help U.S. security interests).
272. Decent-Paying Work Can Deter Terrorism, Labor Advisory Panel Says in New
Report, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), May 15, 2002, at A-12.
273. Catherine Hollingsworth, Labor Diplomacy Panel Shifts Focus of Second Report to
Fighting Terrorism, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 15, 2001, at A-9.
274. See Louis Uchtielle, Were the Good Old Days That Good? N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
2005, at 7 (noting a three point increase in productivity annually since 1995, while median
family income has experienced 0.9% negative growth since 2000).
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they provide to workers, but there are limits in U.S. and international law
that adequately take into account legitimate national security concerns.
While collective bargaining leads to more "process" in the workplace,
presidential and congressional concerns that "inflexibility" will lead to
weakened national security are not borne out by years of experience.
Finally, providing full labor law remedies to undocumented immigrants
who are fired for union activities will not result in increased immigration
endangering our borders. In short, there is no evidence that collective
bargaining harms national security, while there is some evidence that
labor's freedom of association might enhance security.
B. The Constraints of Domestic Law
Domestic constitutional and statutory law will not stop the collision of
liberty and security. The earliest First Amendment cases show that
political liberties were tempered in wartime and in periods of domestic
insecurity. The political fluctuations of the NLRB described earlier mean
that the NLRA will continue to provide inadequate protection for labor's
freedom of association. While there are pushes toward greater freedom of
association among academics and legislators, these movements face stiff
opposition.275 For example, the Employee Free Choice Act would require
an employer to bargain with a union upon the showing of membership
cards signed by a majority of the employees, thus bypassing the NLRB
election process in which the employer thwarts interest in unionization.276
However, the legislation has little hope of passing a Republican-controlled
Congress or President Bush. In addition, domestic constitutional law has
accepted limits on association in times of national security for so long that
it is unlikely to provide relief. 277 Moreover, there has always been a
bifurcation between labor associations seen as primarily for economic
purposes and political association, though I have argued above that this
bifurcation is unwarranted.
As shown by the PATCO strike and the West Coast port dispute,
federal statutes limit the right to strike both by government employees and
private sector employees. In the PATCO strike, federal law precluded the
workers from going on strike. In the West Coast port dispute, the NLRA
275. See MORRis, supra note 29, at 153 (stating that federal labor law already requires
bargaining with employees even before they represent a majority at the workplace).
276. The Employee Free Choice Act, S. 1925 108th Cong. (2003), H.R. 3619 108th
Cong. (2003), was introduced in Congress on November 21, 2003.
277. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Civil Liberties in the Dragon's
Domain: Negotiating the Blurred Boundary between Domestic Law and Foreign Affairs
After 9/11, in SEPTEMBER 11 iN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? 163 (Mary L. Dudziak
ed., 2003) (discussing how the boundaries between domestic law and foreign affairs have
been blurred since 9/11).
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gave the President the right to stop a strike in a time of purported national
emergency. In both cases, however, domestic law prevented the full
exercise of freedom of association and the right to strike. The standard
response would be for labor unions to petition Congress to change the
statutes. However, this response is completely unavailable in the current
political environment.
Constitutional challenges might also be mounted, either under the
constitutional rights of public employees, or as a challenge to the
President's executive authority. However, these challenges have already
been considered and rejected.278 First, the government has a large degree of
constitutional latitude when acting as an employer, such as when it
balances constitutional free speech rights with government efficiency. 79
Second, President George W. Bush's expansion of executive power since
9/11 in the area of enemy combatants and the authority to define torture has
barely been limited.28° Under the retrenchment of rights theory, the
President's use of authority in areas of foreign policy and war will affect
his exercise of authority both as chief executive of the government
workforce and in using emergency powers under the Taft-Hartley Act.28'
278. See United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 78 F. Supp.
710, 710 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (stating that national emergencies did not offend the First, Fifth,
or Thirteenth Amendments of the Constitution, as violations of the freedom of speech, due
process of the law, or involuntary servitude).
279. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1993) (stating that free speech cannot be
completely censored in a government-run hospital); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (declaring a teacher's First Amendment right to free speech was violated when he
was dismissed for speaking about issues of public importance when it was only tangentially
related to his employment).
280. See CASS SUNSTErN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 211
(2005) (noting that the Supreme Court's October 2003 term decisions limiting President
Bush's authority to conduct the War on Terror affirmed the modest principle that, if the
President was going to exercise his power, it had to be subjected to judicial review); Curt
Anderson, Bush Claimed Right to Waive Anti-Torture Laws, Papers Say/ Rumsfeld Ok'd
Detainees Stripped, Threatened with Dogs, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, June 23, 2004, at A4,
available at 2004 WLNR 17420812 (quoting a memo titled "Humane Treatment of al-Qaida
and Taliban Detainees," in which Bush "accept[ed] the legal conclusion of the attorney
general and the Department of Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to
suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to exercise that
authority at this time").
281. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (detailing the President's exercise of
war and emergency powers over enemy combatants); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426
(2004) (same); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2003) (same); see also Tania Cruz, Judicial
Scrutiny of National Security: Executive Restrictions of Civil Liberties When "Fears and
Prejudices Are Aroused," 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 129 (2003) (discussing various ideas
regarding civil liberties limitations when national security is compromised); Stephen J.
Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 305 (2003)
(discussing the prevalence of racial profiling in a heightened security era); Leonard M.
Baynes, Racial Profiling, September 1 1th and the Media: A Critical Race Theory Analysis,
2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002) (detailing media responses to racial profiling in post-9/ 11
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The NLRB decisions and the governmental actions described in Part
IV show the difficulty involved in changing domestic law under the current
Bush administration and Congress. For that matter, the Clinton
administration was unable to pass any change to labor law during its tenure
from 1993 to 2001 .282 The decisions of federal courts, such as in Hoffmnan
and the West Coast port dispute, show that current labor law doctrine has
long undervalued labor's freedom of association. These effects have been
compounded during periods such as the current post-9/11 era. Thus,
labor's freedom of association will not be fully realized without reference
to international human rights principles.
C The Promise and Peril of International Law
International instruments protecting freedom of association can ease
the stresses that eras of domestic insecurity place on recognized human
rights. The place of international law in domestic systems of law has
recently become a topic of serious discussion, particularly in light of recent
Supreme Court cases that raise the issue of the proper role for international
law.25 3 Since the United States is in the midst of what is called "a global
war on terror," international instruments have provided points of reference
in discussions about torture, the law of war, and national emergency. At
the same time, there is growing recognition that worker rights to organize
America).
282. When Congress refused to pass an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act
that would make it illegal to hire permanent replacement workers during a strike, President
Clinton issued an executive order to end the practice on federal contracts. The D.C. Circuit
struck down the order as preempted by the NLRA, which guaranteed management rights to
hire permanent replacements. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
283. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199 (2005) (demonstrating U.S.
Supreme Court respect for international policies by citing the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, Art. 37; the United Nations International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) (Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
a_ccpr.htm; the American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,
Article 4(5); and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art. 5(3) in its
decision striking down the juvenile death penalty); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344
(2003) (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., concurring) (citing to the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination against Women, Art. 1(4)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
573, 576 (2003) (demonstrating U.S. Supreme Court respect for international precedent by
citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981); P.G. & J.H. v. United
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); and Norris v.
Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988) in their decision regarding homosexual consensual sex);
see also Guy Taylor, Justices Get Mexican's Appeal, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 28,
2005, at A4, available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050328-125306-6763r.htm
(discussing the debate between Justices Breyer and Scalia on the place of foreign precedent
in American constitutional law).
2006] LABOR'S FRAGILE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION POST-9/11 343
and bargain collectively are international human rights. 84  Finally,
international law on the suspension of rights during states of emergency is
important because it provides standards outside of the limitations of
domestic law.
Certain international obligations are indisputably part of American
law because they are ratified treaties. For example, Article 22, Section 1,
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
the United States ratified in 1992, states: "Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join
trade unions for the protection of his interests." 285 Section 2 of Article 22
goes further: "No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedom of others.2 86 Professor Charles Morris
has argued that "the federal courts and the NLRB have an obligation to
interpret and enforce the NLRA in conformance with Article 22 of the
Covenant. 287
Finally, the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 16,
Section 1, states: "Everyone has the right to associate freely for
ideological, religious, political, economic, labour, social, cultural, sports or
other purposes. 288  The American Convention also recognizes the
possibility of "restrictions established by law as may be necessary in a
democratic society. ' '189 These conventions are not self-executing, meaning
that they do not provide a private right of action against the government for
their violation, but they are part of the supreme law of the land pursuant to
Article VI of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it is often unclear what effect
such international human rights should have in domestic law, except in
places where reference to the "law of nations" forms the basis for the
violation. Even when such treaties are not self-executing, international law
scholars have identified the need for adjudicators to interpret domestic laws
in a way that does not violate international obligations.2 90
284. See LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN
THE UNITED STATES xi (2004) (detailing "workers' rights violations in the United States in
light of international human rights standards").
285. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, art. 22, § 1 (Dec. 16, 1966),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm.
286. Id. art. 22, § 2.
287. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 146 (2005).
288. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 16, § 1 (Nov. 22, 1969), available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm.
289. Id. art. 16, § 2.
290. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 203 (2d ed. 1996);
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The place of International Labor Organization (ILO) norms in U.S.
law is more problematic, given the United States' schizophrenic attitude
toward the ILO, an arm of the United Nations based in Geneva,
Switzerland. The U.S. is a member state in the ILO but has not ratified all
of the Conventions promulgated by the body. Notably, the United States
has refused to ratify the core associational and collective bargaining
conventions, arguing that its existing laws adequately protect the rights in
the conventions. In 1998, however, the ILO declared that all member
states, as a condition of membership, were bound by four core principles in
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
("Fundamental Declaration"), regardless of whether or not they had ratified
the individual conventions, including the principles embodied in
Conventions 87 and 98. Convention 87 provides workers the right,
"without distinction whatsoever ... to join [and establish] organisations
[sic] of their own choosing. 291 Convention 98 requires ratifying countries
to provide "adequate protection against anti-union discrimination" in
respect of their employment.292
The Fundamental Declaration, while not binding as international law,
reaffirms the normative principle that labor's freedom of association is a
recognized human right.293 Indeed, if we take the assertions of the U.S.
government seriously that domestic law already expresses the same norms
in Conventions 87 and 98, then the application of the Declaration would be
relatively non-controversial.294  Moreover, as discussed above, labor's
freedom of association is indisputably part of international instruments that
the U.S. has ratified. Disputes about whether or not the Declaration, like
other declarations of international organizations, may represent customary
international law are likely to continue for some time.
Carlos M. Vasquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1082, 1143 (1992) (describing the fights and obligations member countries have toward
nationals of the countries with whom they have formed pacts).
291. International Labour Organization Convention 87, Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise, art. 2 (June 17, 1948), available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C087.
292. International Labour Organization Convention 98, Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining, art. 1 (June 8, 1949), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C098.
293. See JAMES A. GROSS, WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2004) (stating that
the Wagner Act was far ahead of its time, "guarantee[ing] the fight to organize and bargain
collectively, core social justice issues for workers"); Philip Alston, Core Labour Standards
and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457,
457-58 (2004) (arguing that the "core labour standards" regime needs to anchor its
principles in the relevant ILO standards).
294. COMPA, supra note 284, at 42 n.52 (stating the United States' position that the
ICCRP Article 22 provisions are different in scope from the ILO Convention 87 fights and
obligations).
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Nevertheless, the emerging jurisprudence of the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA) is already moving toward the recognition of the freedom of
association as part of customary international law. Estate of Rodriguez v.
Drummond Co.,295 a case brought by Colombia citizens seeking redress
against the U.S. company Drummond Coal for a "violation of the law of
nations,296 was one of the first cases to test for freedom of association as a
predicate for ATCA jurisdiction. The company was accused of complicity
or knowledge in a number of murders and kidnappings of trade union
activists in Colombia,297 which if true, would violate not only jus cogens
norms against murder and torture but would also operate to chill freedom
of association. In a ruling on a motion to dismiss, and after canvassing
numerous instruments that pointed to a general international norm of
respect for freedom of association, the court held that the rights to associate
and organize are generally recognized as principles of international law
sufficient to defeat defendants' motion to dismiss. 298 The court admitted
that its ruling was "reluctant" but compelled by the preliminary posture of
the proceedings, where the plaintiffs' allegations are assumed to be true,
and the "international conventions, international customs, treatises, and
judicial decisions rendered in this and other countries. 299
Ironically, the broad concepts embedded in the international freedom
of association instruments discussed above have been given content in the
aftermath of the Supreme Court's Hoffman decision. As discussed above,
the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association found: (1) that the
Hoffinan decision did not comply with ILO Convention 87; and (2) that the
United States should explore all options to rectify the decision, including
changing national laws. The Committee's conclusion shows the breadth of
labor's international right of association. This is because the Hoffman case
did not hold that Jose Castro, the undocumented worker who was without a
remedy for his organizing because of his immigration status, was not
covered by the law; instead, the Court ruled that the remedy would be
inconsistent with immigration control. The Committee's unwillingness to
believe that immigration control should trump labor rights once a worker
was inside the country shows that freedom of association is an important
right.
Similarly, the right to associate encompasses not only those who seek
to form a union and are thwarted by employer opposition but also the
workers in the NLRB decisions who simply sought their coworkers'
295. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
297. Estate of Rodriguez, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
298. Id. at 1264.
299. Id. at 1264 (citing Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. 179 F. 3d 1279,
1295 (1 1th Cir. 1999)).
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assistance in disciplinary interviews with their employer or sought to
exercise the right to strike. These decisions can be viewed as "failure to
enforce" cases, where a different result would be obtained if the law was
interpreted with international principles. These are all private party cases
dealing with judicial or administrative decision-making, which would
benefit from reference to the international right of association.
The reorganization of the federal personnel systems, the exclusion of
TSA screeners, and the West Coast port dispute are all examples of the
government directly using national security as a reason for its actions. On
one level, international human rights instruments accept some limits on
freedom of association in the name of national security. For example,
Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) expressly recognizes that freedom of expression is subject to
restrictions. The ILO conventions also place limits on the extent to which
public sector rights can be abridged. In complaints against the United
States government submitted to the ILO's Freedom of Association
Committee ("the Committee") in 1990, the AFL-CIO alleged that Title VII
of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 "restricts at the federal level the
scope of collective bargaining by excluding wages and other monetary
issues [as non-negotiable] and by providing for the excessive protection of
management rights" in violation of ILO Conventions 87 and 98."0 The
Committee stated that for "certain subjects in the public sector... certain
matters that clearly appertain primarily or essentially to the management
and operation of government business [can] reasonably be regarded as
outside the scope of negotiation." However, the Committee concluded that
"exclusion from the bargaining process of wages and other benefits and
monetary items does not meet the requirements of the principle of
voluntary collective bargaining."' 0'
The national security and public order exceptions to rights enumerated
under the ICCPR were discussed in Tachiona v. Mugabe, an Alien Tort
Claims Act case in which citizens of Zimbabwe brought suit against
Zimbabwe government officials for violations of rights of association,
assembly, and expression and beliefs.30 2 The court stated that "under
certain exigencies threatening safety, security or public order, the state may
justifiably impose reasonable restraints" on the exercise of freedoms
enumerated in the ICCPR.3 °3  However, the court also stated that the
300. Complaints Against the Government of the United States Presented by the AFL-
CIO and the Public Services Int'l (PSI), Rep. No. 284, Case No. 1557 (ILO Freedom of
Ass'n Comm. 1990), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/index.htm, (Follow "specific
country" hyperlink, then "United States" hyperlink, then "Freedom of Association"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
301. Id.
302. 243 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
303. Id. at 433.
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exceptions are "strictly construed by the authorities that have ruled on it,
[and] are circumscribed by the limitations., 30 4 The court then held in favor
of plaintiffs that there was "no evidence in this case of the existence of any
public emergency officially proclaimed, or any necessity of national
security or public order, that may have presented even colorable grounds to
justify the state's actions as a warranted derogation from its obligations to
ensure Plaintiffs' rights. 3 °5 The Tachiona case shows the high bar that
international law places in order to claim a national security exemption
from protected rights.
With regard to the suspension of labor rights under the ILO
Conventions, the ILO's Committee of Experts has noted:
[A] state of emergency is frequently invoked to justify
exemptions from the obligations arising under the Conventions
on freedom of association, but ... such a pretext cannot be used
to justify restrictions on the civil liberties that are essential to the
proper exercise of trade union rights, except in cases of extreme
gravity. Any such restrictions must be limited in scope and
duration to what is strictly necessary to deal with the situation in
question. While it is conceivable that the exercise of some civil
liberties, such as the right to public assembly or the right to hold
street demonstrations, might be limited, suspended and even
prohibited, it is not permissible that the guarantees relating to the
security of the person should be limited, suspended or
abolished.306
Such pronouncements place a heavy burden on the government to show
why national security is truly threatened by low-level employees having
collective bargaining rights. The claims the U.S. government has made
about the "greater flexibility" needed to fight the War on Terror do not
seem to meet the burden set by international standards. Administration
officials' use of national security as a pretext for ending labor's freedom of
association, reorganizing federal personnel systems, and excluding airport
screeners from collective bargaining would not conform to ILO principles
(even if they conform to domestic law).
The question of the recourse available for violations of the ILO
conventions remains. As stated above, there is little the ILO will do except
implore the government to comply with international standards. The value
of international condemnation should not be underestimated. International
bodies will also take into account the climate of retrenchment of civil
liberties in evaluating claims of national security exceptions to labor's
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Lee Swepston, Human Rights Law and Freedom of Association: Development
Through ILO Supervision, 137 INT'L LAB. REv 169, 179 (1998) (emphasis added).
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freedom of association. It is unclear whether or not the ILO has the will to
criticize the U.S. government harshly for its labor-related actions in the
War on Terror. The most recent opinion from the ILO, regarding the
Hoffnan decision, took the U.S. to task for failing to enforce the labor
rights of migrants. The AFGE's ILO complaint remains to be resolved.
Thus, the ILO could provide a powerful voice by calling the U.S.
government's actions into question, but it must be remembered that the
ILO lacks any power to enforce its recommendations.
This is why U.S. courts must engage in searching judicial review of
government actions using international principles. While many would
object to the introduction of international concepts into U.S. courts,
international law is increasingly becoming accepted through many of the
avenues discussed earlier, such as the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Universal
Declaration, and constitutional cases that rely on a consensus of nations.
While these instruments may not be self-executing or lack a private right of
action, courts should look to these principles in deciding whether the
national health and safety is imperiled, or whether national security
requires the exclusion of certain workers from bargaining.
In all of the post-9/11 examples that I have discussed, the three
branches of the United States government have constricted labor's freedom
of association, even though no impact on national security existed. In the
Hoffman decision, even though the Supreme Court did not explicitly
connect national insecurity and labor rights for undocumented immigrants
in its decision, the connection between immigration control and the threats
posed to the U.S. in the months after 9/11 was a sub rosa factor in the
Court's decision. While international law must be tempered by concerns of
national sovereignty, it is unclear that the standards used to end the West
Coast port dispute in the name of national security are justifiable even
under domestic law. Nevertheless, it is clear that labor unions and
employers whose disputes affect interstate commerce will face the
government's argument that increasing outsourcing of military functions
requires the free flow of commerce as a national security imperative.
The courts' acquiescence to the Executive Branch's national security
arguments may only embolden the administration to accomplish its
objectives under the rubric of national security. The statute creating the
Department of Homeland Security in 2002 took away many bargaining
rights for several classifications in the department, and the 2005 regulations
for the DHS and the Department of Defense went even further. Again, the
government's national security rationale seems to fall below the burden
placed on nations by international law. Finally, the NLRB's decision in
IBM Corp. itself may violate freedom of association principles, and it is
clear that no national security exception would apply, since the decision is
intended to safeguard private employers, not the government entities that
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would have standing to utilize the exception.
The difficulty is to determine where the line will be drawn. Since
9/11, however, the U.S. government has failed to show that collective
bargaining and freedom of association are inconsistent with national
security. These instruments require a declared state of emergency before
customary labor protections can be curtailed. Although the government
declared a state of emergency for a brief period after 9/11, according to
Kim Lane Scheppele, the administration has acted as if the emergency
powers have continued to override national laws.3 °7 As Michael Ignatieff
has pointed out: "An emergency is just that: a temporary state, not an
indefinite and open-ended revocation of the rule of law. 30 8
In all the cases discussed above, the labor law adjudicative bodies had
to reconcile competing questions of immigration control and labor
remedies (Hoffinan), the right to strike and the interests of the employer
(IPS), and the right to have coworkers present in disciplinary actions and
the ability of the employer to conduct the investigation (IBM). Neither
federal statutory law nor precedent provided clear answers to these
questions, and in each case, labor's freedom of association was weakened.
The use of international principles to guide the decision-making process
should be used to guide the results in future cases.30 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The historical dialectic between liberty and security continues in post-
9/11 America. Many feel that all civil liberties have been compromised in
the name of national security. However, the rights of workers to organize
and bargain collectively, as recognized by federal labor law and
international human rights instruments, can only flourish in an environment
307. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004) (describing the Bush admini-
stration's willingness to invoke emergency powers to make domestic and foreign policy);
see also Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004) (providing for a
new constitutional framework in the present state of emergency created by terrorist attacks).
But see David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Constitution's Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J.
1753 (2004) (casting doubt on Ackerman's proposal of an emergency constitution and
suggesting that the model fails to address the threats that the war on terror has imposed on
civil liberties); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution,
113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004) (criticizing Ackerman's emergency constitution proposal and
suggesting it is time to move away from the survivalist stance of post-September 11).
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(2004).
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of respect for other civil liberties essential to democratic societies-the
right to protest, the freedom of speech, and the right to vote. The
International Labor Organization has recognized this thesis with respect to
the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which protects the
freedom of association, and in particular the right to organize trade unions:
The guarantees set out in international labour Conventions, in
particular those relating to freedom of association, can only be
effective if the civil and political rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international
instruments are genuinely recognized and protected.31 °
Unfortunately, the fragility of civil liberties in the United States has
become evident after the terrible attacks of 9/11. The post-9/1 1 era can be
seen as simply the next chapter in a national dialectic between liberty and
security. The historical text on the post-9/11 era is incomplete, however, so
there are conflicting signals about whether civil rights and civil liberties
will be permanently constrained.
This Article has examined the impact that limitations on the
"political" civil liberties, such as the right to assemble and protest, can have
on the right to organize and bargain collectively. Reliance on domestic law
alone will not prevent the collision of security and worker rights because
constitutional liberties have frequently been limited during wartime.
Domestic law enforcement and judges have sometimes operated in a state
of self-imposed emergency that has resulted in limitations on rights
protected by domestic law. Thus, international rights of freedom of
association will have to be utilized in both the public and private sectors.
International law provides both promise and peril, however, because
instruments protecting freedom of association incorporate the need to
balance national security against free association.
The War on Terror might be said to have only an indirect effect on
labor's freedom of association. Few would doubt that the Bush
Administration did not consider labor an ally even before 9/11 31 Many of
the actions taken by the President since 9/11 may be reversed by later
administrations. The prospects for serious change under either Democrats
or Republicans is belied by the inability of past Democratic administrations
to enact serious change and the bipartisan fear of seeming "soft" on
national security. The indirect and subtle weakening of labor's right of
association through the War on Terror is more long-lasting. Actions taken
310. Gernigon, supra note 35, at 13.
311. See Rick Fantasia & Kim Voss, Bush's Low Intensity War on Labor,
COUNTERPUNCH, June 18, 2003, available at http://www.counterpunch.org/
fantasia06182003.html (noting that the Bush administration had previously shown
"indifference to workers and contempt for their unions").
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since 9/11 may seriously damage the long-term prospects for a new
upsurge in the power of labor's freedom of association.
12
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